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Identity Crisis: The Politics of
Interpretation
Allan C. Hutchinson*
"I speak in sexual drag."' With these words, Mary Joe Frug an-
nounces the promise, problems and politics of the postmodern writer.
Her pithy pronouncement puts firmly into play the compelling ques-
tions of identity, authority and authenticity that dominate much mod-
ern theorizing. Who is this "I" that speaks? Whose voice does she
"speak" in? What is the force of "sexual"? Is there an "I" beneath the
"drag"? Can the "I" ever not be in "drag"? Are there only different
"drag" costumes to be fitted and later discarded? Does the "I" choose
the attire of living? Is the "I" chosen by the "drag"? What would it
mean for the "I" to be spoken rather than to speak? Can there be a
"drag" that is not "sexual"?
It is the burden of this essay to place these questions in a
postmodern frame of reference and to offer some tentative and provi-
sional answers. If recent episodes in literary and legal circles are any-
thing to go by, there seems to be some force to the claim that the
contested questions of identity, authority and authenticity are back in
vogue and with a vengeance. The operating assumptions and inform-
ing suppositions of the legal community's practice and politics on race
and gender are closely implicated in such issues. Apart from remedy-
ing old inequalities, it is contended that the appointment of women
judges has high priority because they can bring a different experience
and sense ofjudgment to legal interpretation and the decision-making
craft. Similarly, it is regularly argued whether there should be affirma-
tive action for women and men of color in order for them to become
law students or professors because their identities as women and men
of color challenge the allegedly color-blind standards of meritocratic
enrolment. Also, it is a matter of heated debate whether the scholar-
ship of women and people of color should be accorded greater signifi-
cance in discussions of sexism and racism because their understanding
of such discrimination is more authentic and, therefore, more deserv-
ing of authoritative status.
* Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. Many thanks to my
Jurisprudence Class of 1992, Pam Carpenter, and Rose Della Rocca for comments
and support.
1. MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINIsM 229 (1992).
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These political and pressing encounters, and the divisions and ran-
cor that they give rise to, touch issues and have implications of
profound theoretical significance. At the approachingfin de si&le, law's
life has taken on an increasingly hermeneutical round of existence: it is
a troubled combination of intellectual logic and political experience.
As a site for interpretive activity, law is both a reflective and reflexive
effort to make sense of human struggle. As such, lawyers are engaged
as active participants in the mediation and negotiation of political
meaning through legal interpretation. Whether in the courtroom, the
law-office or the classroom, the practice and skills of interpretation lie
at the dynamic heart of the legal enterprise. At times, this involves the
expansive reading and re-writing of sprawling social texts. At other
times, it concerns the more prosaic writing and re-reading of more pa-
rochial legal texts. 2 But, in all cases, unable to escape the creative op-
portunities and constraining responsibilities of interpretive activity,
lawyers function on the contested territory of hermeneutical practice.
Moreover, these contemporary and controversial incidents also pro-
vide evidence of the relevance of such theoretical engagements to prac-
tical disputes. In particular, the Barthian notion that "writing is that
neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away" and
where "the author enters into his own death" seems to have been aban-
doned.3 Buried, but not dead, 'the author' seems bent on resurrecting
herself and making her authoritative presence felt in the interpretive
encounter: the ghost of authors past stalks present interpretive efforts
at avoiding future misunderstandings. This reincarnation is particu-
larly confusing as it seems to be championed by the more radical vec-
tors of literary and legal circles. After years of celebrating the death of
the author and urging this fact on an unreceptive audience, there seems
to have been a critical change of heart. A strong sense exists that, if
"the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the Author,"'4 that cost
may have been too high a price to pay: the authorial subject has not
slipped away and the space she occupies is far from neutral, composite
or oblique. In short, authorship and authenticity matter and they mat-
ter in ways that are urgent and political.
In this essay, therefore, I want to demonstrate that writing and read-
ing are important and that the identity of those who write and read is
important. The struggle to ensure that there are more women and
blacks in the legal and literary community must be continued vigor-
ously. However, I also believe that there is no going back on the under-
2. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973); Paul
Rabinow & William M. Sullivan, The Interpretive Turn: Emergence of An Approach, in
INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE 1 (Paul Rabinow & William M. Sullivan eds., 1979).
3. Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE MUSIC TEXT 142 (Stephen
Heath trans., 1977).
4. Id. at 148.
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standing of 'the death of the author.' There is no value at all in trying
to re-install the author as the authoritative linchpin in the interpretive
process or to bestow a transcending authority on the voice of authenti-
cated experience. The challenge, of course, is to show that it is possible
(and desirable) to hold on to both claims without fatally undermining
either. In this sense, I want to contribute to the postmodern effort of
making "the problem of the subject . . . part of the story." 5
I. INTERPRETIVE TURNS
In order to get at and explicate the contested notions of authorship,
authenticity and authority, I will re-pose and re-answer Michel Fou-
cault's famous and characteristically enigmatic question-"[w]hat dif-
ference does it make who is speaking?" 6 Taking aim at the traditional
matching of authorial identity and interpretive authority, he sought to
disrupt efforts to use authorial intent as a principle of thrift in the
proliferation of meaning. His whole essay can be read as a largely rhe-
torical dismissal of the relevance of authors in the hermeneutical enter-
prise-in effect, an indifference to the difference that difference might
make, if any, in who is speaking. Foucault is interested in the operation
of discourse as a productive process of subject-formation rather than as
the formed process of productive subjects; discourse i la Foucault cre-
ates as much as it is created. 7
While I want to hold on to that account, I also want to elaborate and
supplement it by showing that there is a different notion of difference
that is at work and that is important in understanding fully the herme-
neutical problematic-in effect, a serious interest in the kind of differ-
ence that difference might make in who is speaking. In short, I will
draw a distinction between the metaphysical claim of 'difference' and a
political understanding of 'difference.' Whereas the former ought to
have no purchase in the world of interpretive practice and theory, the
latter is of vital significance. It is through the metaphysical death of the
author that the political writer (and reader) comes to life. It is in this
important sense that it matters and makes a difference who is speaking
(and reading).
The theoretical nature and practical force of the dilemma of differ-
ence is neatly captured by an English incident in 1987. Virago Press, a
feminist publishing house, accepted for publication a book of stories
about generational conflicts in Britain's Asian community. The author
was Rahila Khan who described herself as an Asian woman and a re-
cluse. 'She' turned out to be a white, male, Anglican priest named
5. Pierre Schlag, The Problem of The Subject, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1628 (1991).
6. MICHEL FOUCAULT, What Is an Author?, in THE FOUCAULT READER 101, 120
(Paul Rabinow ed. &Josu6 V. Harari trans., 1984).
7. See ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, DWELLING ON THE THRESHOLD: CRITICAL ESSAYS
ON MODERN LEGAL THOUGHT (1989).
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Toby Forward. Although he insisted that he was a socialist, a feminist
and an anti-racist, the publishers expressed outrage and distress at For-
ward's deception: " '[h]e pretended to occupy a space that isn't his.' ",8
What troubled the publishers about his behavior was more than his
free-riding on an enterprise established to redress the historical imbal-
ance in publishing opportunities available to women, especially women
of color. They believed that his text was invalidated not so much by its
content-after all, the book had been accepted for publication by liter-
ary feminists-but by the counterfeited identity of its author. Con-
cerned about the possible insult to the Asian community and their own
credibility, the Press decided not to proceed with publication. By way
of response, Toby Forward argued that, although there may have been
some elements of mischievousness and opportunism in his action, his
primary motivation was that he might, by speaking with a voice that was
not his own, strive to attain the artistic aspirations of a traditional liter-
ary ethic: " '[m]y own alienation was too personal and painful for me to
write about, but it gave me a way into the lives and minds of others who
for different reasons and in different circumstances felt something of
the same things.' "9
This incident raises a whole raft of queries and questions about the
interlocking and controversial character of identity, authenticity and
authority. For some, the Khan affair will persuade them that identity
has little to do with the search for an authentic and authoritative angle
on oppression and exploitation. The mark of good literature-an im-
aginative effort at understanding the human condition better-is to be
found in its effects, not in its causes. For others, the value or merit of a
book is closely tied to the circumstances of its creation. The identity of
the author will be paramount because the authority of the writing will
be derived from the authenticity of the experience from which it arises:
the silenced voice of oppression will speak truth to a complacent world.
For me, both of these stances are partly right and partly wrong. The
value of any contribution to the struggle for a better world can never be
only fixed by its maker's identity: there is no one authentic experience
of anything that deserves authority purely by dint of that experience
alone. However, the weight to be attached to any contribution may
well be affected by the circumstances of its making and reception: iden-
tity is neither entirely dispensable nor completely determinative.
The resolution of such contested matters like identity, authenticity
and authority is less about truth and more about politics: truth is never
separable from politics. Any appreciation of what is involved in the fa-
miliar acts of reading and writing entails a sense of political commit-
8. KARL MILLER, AUTHORS 183-85, 184 (1989) (quoting spokeswoman for
Virago). It should be noted that Miller takes a line on the incident which is very
different from my own.
9. Id. at 184 (quoting Toby Forward, LONDON REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 4, 1988).
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ment as much as a talent for philosophical rigor. This does not mean
that interpretation is wholly reduced to politics; writing and reading are
to be correlated to rather than collapsed into the politics of their his-
tory. In the same way that any hermeneutical endeavor cannot slip free
of history, jurisprudential reflection is politically charged; legal theories
are not an evasion of ideology, but a re-location of it. Even the most
intransigent claim that legal interpretation can and must proceed
apolitically is of utmost political and ideological significance. Interpre-
tation cannot be grounded on empirical facts nor validated by any met-
aphysical truth; each is never beyond interpretation, but only takes on
meaning within an interpretive framework. By revisiting this whole
question of authorial identity, interpretive politics and authentic expe-
rience, I hope to debunk further the traditional understanding of meta-
physics and epistemology as categories of inquiry that are, and must
continue to be, insulated from the adulterating influence of politics.
There is nothing above, below, beyond or before politics, but more
politics; no interpretation stands innocent of the charge of political
involvement.
Because politics and history are always the context for theoretical
engagement, it is the case that hermeneutical strategies have implica-
tions for politics and history. While it does not have any determinate or
necessary consequences for interpretive practice, hermeneutical affilia-
tion does effect a general orientation and focus that renders some out-
comes more likely than others.' 0 Accordingly, any theoretical study
must be able to justify itself and can only be useful if it can ease suffer-
ing and help change the world. If it is to be of service, it must be pre-
pared to carry some implications or address the real issues that divide
and plague society-economic deprivation, literacy, sexual violence,
education, racial hatred and other such issues. While penetrating anal-
yses of oppression and performances of textual radicalism will not in
themselves bring an end to oppression, they can contribute to that
cause. By opening up legal texts and social contexts from the hold of
traditional interpretive strategies, it might be possible to make them
available for interested attempts at more democratic appropriation.
Accordingly, this essay traverses a whole range of topics and
problems that are gathered together under the rubric of identity, au-
thenticity and authority. Writing as a white, male, heterosexual, forty-
year-old academic of working-class background,' I will examine the
hermeneutical enterprise in the context of racial, gender and sexual
politics. The approach will be postmodern. The first few sections of
10. This claim is, of course, controversial and needs to be defended. See
STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989).
11. I have already tried to address this issue more fully and explicitly in an
earlier essay. See Allan C. Hutchinson, Inessentially Speaking (Is There Politics After Post-
Modernism?), 89 MICH. L. REV. 1549 (1991).
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the essay lay out the postmodern perspective and contrast it with the
modernist stance and ambition of more traditional jurists. Next, I will
demonstrate how such a deconstructive mode of inquiry re-illuminates
and reconfigures the notions of identity, authenticity and authority in
legal, political and literary interpretation. The latter sections of the es-
say reject a politics of identity and adumbrate a more action-based,
public politics that is more consistent with the postmodern insight.
II. LAw STUFF
Most will remember the classic Marshall McLuhan scene in Woody
Allen's Annie Hall.'2 Alvy and Annie are waiting in line for a movie.
Behind them, there is a verbose academic trying to impress his bored
date with his cinematographic erudition. An exasperated Alvy cannot
resist intervening when the man begins to pontificate on the views of
Marshall McLuhan. When Alvy tells him that his version of
McLuhanian thinking is nonsense, the man defends its validity by offer-
ing his credentials as a teacher of a communications class at Columbia
University. In his comic coup de grace, Alvy brings into the scene
McLuhan himself who promptly puts the flabbergasted academic in his
place-"You know nothing of my work.... How you ever got to teach
a course in anything is totally amazing." To end the scene, Alvy turns
to the camera and laments, "Boy, if only life were like this."'
3
There are many instructive and insightful lessons in this wonder-
fully funny scene. First, and not least, it works as a severe chastisement
of academics' propensity to pretention and indulgence; it cautions
against the dangers of ignoring too easily common-sensical intuitions
and moving too far and too abstractly away from the feet-on-the-floor
experience of mundane living. It also points up the male tendency to
resort mistakenly to intellectual machismo as a preferred mode of im-
pressing women. But, more substantively, Allen's acerbic humor
touches a raw nerve in the body ofjurisprudential scholarship-the rel-
evance, importance and status, if any, of the author in contested mat-
ters of textual interpretation. His cinematic text offers an instinctively
reasonable critique of academic efforts at hermeneutical sophistication.
In particular, it makes a graphic and pointed challenge to contempo-
rary juristic attempts to establish the critical claim that authorial intent
and identity have no special privilege in the interpretive task of fixing
the meaning of social and documentary texts. Following Mark Twain,
Allen seems to be suggesting that academic reports of 'the death of the
author' as a figure of interpretive authority and significance have been
greatly exaggerated.
On the jurisprudential front, legal theory has been energized by the
12. ANNIE HALL (United Artists 1977).




need to negotiate between the competing claims of authors and inter-
preters as the ultimate location of hermeneutical authority over dis-
puted texts. This need is experienced to be particularly pressing in law
because answers to questions of interpretive authority and validity can
have direct and devastating consequences for individuals and society
generally. Consequently, drawing on a whole battery of intellectual
and inter-disciplinary insights, it has become the self-assigned task of
contemporary legal theory to fathom the disputed roles of author, in-
terpreter and text. While its eclectic efforts are all over the hermeneuti-
cal map and defy any simple tracing or general categorization, the
juristic ambition is to establish the parameters of a suitable hermeneuti-
cal practice for modern times.14 Unfortunately (or fortunately),
postmodernism has thrown a deconstructive wrench in the modernist
works.
The traditional approach to interpretation places great authoritative
sway on the intent of the author. The meaning of any disputed text can
be fixed by retrieving the intent of its author; the hermeneutical exer-
cise is most decidedly a matter of discovery and not creation. Author-
ship is a communicative act that brings into being a text that functions
as a medium through which the writer attempts to convey a discrete
experience of consciousness to its potential readers. In such a scheme,
meaning is a precious gem that is secreted in the text to be found by
diligent and discriminating readers. For example, Richard Posner
maintains that legal interpretation is about reconstructing authors' in-
tentions in order to assess how authors might have answered any ques-
tion of interpretation if it had been put to them: "the reader's task is to
open a channel to the mind of the author."' 5 In this view, the recover-
ability of authorial intent works as a point of fixity in a world of flux; it
is a hermeneutical haven in an anarchical world. This theory has much
greater support, albeit often unthinking and uncritical, in everyday
legal practice than legal theorists would care to admit; it is the interpre-
tive common sense of the legal and literary community.
Notwithstanding this, much contemporary jurisprudence has been
devoted to working through the implications of 'the death of the au-
thor' for legal interpretation. That debate has been most vigorous in
constitutional law. The basic claim is essentially normative. Judicial in-
terpretation can only be legitimate so long as it seeks to give demo-
cratic effect to the original act of consent by the people to the
Constitution as a document to limit governmental power. Most impor-
tantly, it is recognized that the best evidence of the Constitution's
14. For a sampling of the different attempts to map the landscape, see SANFORD
LEVINSON & STEVEN MAILLOUX, INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE (1988).
15. RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 221
(1988).
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meaning is the Framers' intentions. 16 The overwhelming response to
this has been that not only is this claim normatively dubious and con-
testable, but that, even if it were somehow desirable, it is entirely un-
realizable. It is by no means self-evident that democracy is best served
by giving effect to the views of long-dead politicians which received
only indirect consent from the enfranchised few at the time. Moreover,
past intentions, particularly of collective entities, seem doggedly resis-
tant to future understanding. Intention is not a simple fact that stands
antecedent to interpretation, but is in need of interpretation before it
can be understood in general or specific terms. In short, author-based
interpretation is "frequently historically uncertain, practically indeter-
minate, politically repugnant, conceptually incoherent, and contra-
dicted by the evidence that the Framers' intent was that the Framers'
intent should not bind future generations."' 17
Although the majority of mainstream jurists have conceded, if reluc-
tantly, the death of 'the author' as a figure of interpretive authority,
they are still fully committed to the hermeneutical enterprise of trying
to locate and justify an authoritative method of interpreting legal texts.
While there are almost as many theories of interpretation as there are
interpreters, legal theorists refuse to accept that there is no legitimate
and appropriate form ofjudicial review-what they choose to call 'con-
stitutional law'-in a democratic republic. The particular challenge
that they have set themselves is to ensure that, having wrested control
of the text from the tyrannical grip of the author, the interpretive enter-
prise is not allowed to slide into a maelstrom of reader anarchy in which
interpretation is an occasion for personal caprice and self-serving prej-
udice. In short, although they might have rescued meaning from
drowning in a tub of authorial bathwater, they must be careful not to
run the risk of allowing the hermeneutic baby to die of thirst.
Accordingly, as a hedge against the imagined twin evils of an over-
bearing authorial constraint and an undisciplined reader freedom,
mainstream theorists attempt to cabin the textual search for meaning in
some communal precepts of interpretive regularity or in the establish-
ment of an interpretive practice of institutional integrity. For example,
16. See Edwin Meese, Address Before the American Bar Association (July 9,
1985), reprinted in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITrEN CONSTITUTION
9-10 (1986); RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 13-20 (1987).
This is not to be confused with the related claim that the text is the intention of the
Framers. See Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the 'Black Ink' of the Framers' Intention,
100 HARV. L. REV. 751 (1987); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of
Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). For a balanced and accessible
introduction, see Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989).
17. James D.A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 AM.
U. L. REV. 625 (1988). For other general critiques, see Mark V. Tushnet, Following
the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV.
781 (1983) and RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33-57 (1985).
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Ronald Dworkin maintains that legal interpretation should proceed on
the basis that legal rights and duties "were all created by a single au-
thor-the community personified-expressing a coherent conception
ofjustice and fairness."' 18 There still remains the enduring formalistic
belief that law involves politics, but only neutrally so; it is important
and possible that interpretation be kept distinct from outright ideologi-
cal debate. Within this framework, the emerging pragmatic under-
standing holds that interpretive authority is generated in the organic,
sophisticated and responsive interaction between the law and its inter-
preters. As Robert Post puts it, "constitutional adjudication, like all
law, is... balanced on the human faculty ofjudgment[;] ... pertinent
considerations may be more or less compelling, and consequently the
ability to exercise judgment more or less sustained."' 19
III. THE CRITICAL CUT
One group of critics has refused to play this mainstream game.
While obviously not alone in posting the obituary of the legal author,
their postmodern or deconstructive approach to matters of legal inter-
pretation makes them its most uncompromising and least tentative ne-
crologists. Their unwillingness to compromise has not only set them
clearly apart from more mainstream necrologists, but it has brought
them under heavy political fire. Rejecting all mainstream attempts to
legitimize legal discourse as an ideologically-neutral pursuit of inter-
pretive truth, they have taken seriously the broader and deeper ramifi-
cations of the-death-of-the-author. 20 While they do not always dance
irreverently on the grave of authorial authority, they do not lament or
fret at its passing. The fact that the author of a text or the text itself
cannot authoritatively control or constrain the meaning-giving exercise
is put to practical and arguably radical effect. Texts, like the Constitu-
tion or doctrinal judgments, that appear to carry a narrow and con-
servative meaning are shown to be capable of giving rise to
transformative and expansive interpretations. Similarly, texts authored
by reactionary writers, such as legislators or judges, can also be liber-
ated to serve progressive ends. By taking interpretation seriously, they
have struggled to show that even the darkest textual cloud can have its
own silver political lining.
However, so the argument goes, the critics have become political
victims of their own hermeneutical success. At bottom, the spirited re-
18. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225 (1986).
19. Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 13
(1990). See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739
(1982); JAMES B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984).
20. See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine,
94 YALE L.J. 976 (1985).
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buttal to critical attempts to sabotage the mainstream hermeneutical
project rests on the argument that the defeat of authorial tyranny and
the political inconvenience of textual certainty has been bought at the
bankrupting price of reader anarchy. It is claimed that, when push
comes to shove, critical skepticism leads to the conclusion that texts
mean everything and, therefore, nothing: any text can mean anything
that anybody wants it to mean. If any text can mean anything, then all
interpretations are equally valid and any interpretation is as valid as any
other. The only constraints on interpretation are imaginative ingenuity
and political cunning. The text becomes a blank cheque that can be
written in the readers' preferred political currency. For the mainstream
critic, this is no interpretation at all: it is reduced to only the crudity of
ideological appropriation. This point is most forcefully made by Don
Herzog in his Woody Allen-esque critique of Mark Tushnet's work:
I have a distressingly large library, one which keeps growing. I lug
books from my apartment to my office, from one library to another,
from New York to Michigan. I pile them up and occasionally face the
incredibly dreary task of loading them into boxes. Why do I bother?
Why don't I have just one text, say a large piece of paper with the tan-
talizing word "TEXT" inscribed in the middle in Gothic lettering? I
could then interpret it any way I wanted: I could read Henry James
into it, or out of it, orJoyce, or Simmel, or .... And why does Tushnet
publish so much? Could he hold the skeptical view about his own
work? Would he never complain that he had been misread? Suppose I
read Tushnet's article-or the Constitution-as the story of a small boy
growing up in Kansas during the Great Depression. (Suppose I read all
texts that way.) Is that just a view the community is not likely to en-
dorse, or is it wrong?2 1
This line of theoretical criticism leads to a more political objection
to the critical approach. It is asserted that, even if there were to be a
successful demonstration of textual indeterminacy, it would be of very
dubious political merit. By adopting a posture of thoroughgoing skep-
ticism, the critics cut the ground from under their own feet. By pro-
ceeding on their campaign of hermeneutical terrorism and razing all
interpretive strategies before them, it is contended that there is no
place from which to launch or justify their own positive proposals for
social change: any political manifesto would be entirely unconvincing
and could be "derided as culture-bound, historically contingent, sub-
jective, unverifiable. ' '2 2 Consequently, it is contended that the Critical
summer is not quite the democratic idyll that it is claimed to be, but is
21. Don Herzog, As Many As Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast, 75 CAL. L. REV.
609, 629 (1987) (discussing Tushnet, supra note 17). In an equally witty aside, Kim
Lane Scheppele compares the Constitution to a recipe for key lime pie. She reports
that judges never confuse the two and cooks do not assert that "recipes reveal
rights or the separation of governmental powers." KIM L. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL
SECRETS 89-90 n.13 (1988).
22. POSNER, supra note 15, at 217; see also Robin L. West, Adjudication is Not
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more a fool's paradise where the glib are convinced by their own rhe-
torical illusions of naive grandeur.
For instance, it is argued that, if deconstruction is such a potent
method for transforming and radicalizing textual meaning, there is not
only no interpretive warrant for introducing black-authored texts into
the canon of literary or legal scholarship, but there is no hermeneutical
need for such a political change. The works of white authors will serve
as ample diet for the deconstructive appetite and reconstructive imagi-
nation. Moreover, the introduction of women-authored texts will be of
no particular consequence because, as the critics themselves have am-
ply demonstrated, the authors of texts have no influence over the
meaning that can be attributed to their texts; the text and its meaning
will be interpreted as its readers decree. On both counts, therefore,
there is no need for change from the status quo: white-authored texts
can be made to do the work of black-authored texts and women-au-
thored texts will not be able to retain their womanness in the face of
disruptive interpretations by white readers. Furthermore, the whole
notion of black and white texts is bogus-is it not the cri de coeur of the
deconstructionists that the identity of a text's author is irrelevant to the
interpretive process? As such, mainstream theorists conclude that any
support that critics want give to the appointment of more women
judges or the admission of more black students into law school is fatally
undermined: deconstruction undercuts politics and politics marginal-
izes deconstruction.
These criticisms offer a powerful challenge to postmodern or
deconstructive practice as a radical mode of political engagement or
interpretive ingenuity. Is it now time to abandon Barthes' claim about
authorship, a claim that has been so important in modern literary and
legal theory? Must a space be made for the author to body forth and
become a real presence again in the hermeneutical process? Or should
we affirm with Barthes that the author is dead and urge that all this
morbid talk about authors should cease? Does a radical political prac-
tice demand that the author be rehabilitated as an essential figure of
interpretive authority? Or does it mean that the re-birth of the author
signals the death of textual indeterminacy as a radical interpretive
practice?
These questions raise difficult issues and the challenge of main-
stream jurists is not entirely without merit. Indeed, the critics them-
selves are partly responsible for bringing something of this on
themselves. In their enthusiastic and rigorous commitment to uncover-
ing false claims to privileged status at every turn, there has been an
understandable temptation to herald the demise of authorial authority
and its replacement by the empowered reader as a necessarily progres-
Interpretation: Some Reservation About the Law-as-Literature Movement, 54 TENN. L. REV.
203 (1987).
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sive achievement by critical workers in the name of democratic revolu-
tion. While this represents a political advance, such a critical move is
very problematic as it simply shifts power from one group and is con-
tent to confer it on another. Whereas authors were once privileged,
readers now move into the exalted role of meaning-fixers. 23 However,
the whole critical endeavor takes place within the very same framework
of hermeneutical assumptions as the traditional agenda that it is in-
tended to subvert. It works within and with the notion of interpretive
authority rather than seeking to dispense with it altogether. As elabo-
rated by some of its alleged champions, the postmodern critique is con-
tent to topple the old king in order to crown a new queen when it is the
very institution of monarchic authority that needs to be overthrown.
By understanding deconstructive critique as a way to confer inter-
pretive authority on readers rather than as a total challenge to the pro-
ject of locating hermeneutical authorization, the postmodern
perspective is tamed and its political edge is blunted. However, once a
more appropriate grasp of the deconstructive perspective is achieved, it
will become clearer what is involved in the actual theory and practice of
legal interpretation. Moreover, it will take the critical wind out of the
mainstream's sails and provide a more cogent account of the possibility
and tack of a postmodern politics. It is not that deconstruction under-
cuts politics nor that politics marginalizes deconstruction, but that
deconstruction makes a certain kind of politics attainable and attractive.
As such, the rest of this essay is devoted to demonstrating that there is
no contradiction between a continuing loyalty to a deconstructive strat-
egy, as properly understood, and the practical realization of a radical
political agenda. In short, I will show that a deconstructive approach to
law is both textually viable and politically radical. While it is not the
ground for a progressive politics, it is a complementary strategy for
one.
IV. A POSTMODERN (IM)POSTURE?
"[A]Il cats may be black at night, but not to other cats."
-Henry Louis Gates, Jr.2 4
Postmodernism is a flat rejection of universal knowledge and an
outright denial of essential truths. In contrast to the modernist project
it begins with an implacable incredulity toward grand theories of social
explanation and meta-narratives of ultimate emancipation. Rather than
think of the individual subject as a unitary and sovereign subject whose
self-directed vocation is to bring the world to heel through the exacting
discipline of rational inquiry, postmodernism interrogates the whole
23. See TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 85 (1983).




idea of autonomous subjectivity and abstract reason; it places them in a
constantly contingent condition of provisionality. 25 Of course, it does
not obliterate the experience of subjectivity nor the availability of rea-
son, but it problematizes them in order to understand them as being
multiple, contextual and protean. Subjects and reason can never be
entirely self-present to themselves in an unmediated and unsituated
form. There is no escape from the historical horizons of social living to
the transcending imperatives of Destiny, History, Progress, Nature or
whatever. In short, knowledge and truth are always fragmentary.
26
Subjects and reasons abound, but there is no Subject nor Reason. By
deploying such a skeptical strategy, the political hope is to destabilize
power, displace domination and dismantle hierarchy.
Deconstruction is the interpretive relative of the postmodern family.
It does not offer itself as one more interpretive methodology in locating
textual meaning. In contrast to Pope's modernist idea that "Expression
is the Dress of Thought,"' 27 such a postmodern critique maintains that
language is not a jumble of accumulated vestments, but it is a system
that neither labels nor represents the world of reality. Meaning is a
differentiating function within that linguistic structure itself; reality can-
not be apprehended from outside its discursive standpoint. Being in-
ternal to it, meaningful thinking does not precede nor can it be the pre-
condition of communication and expression. Meaning is not transmit-
ted through language by independent subjects, possessed of pre-lin-
guistic thought, but the communicating subjects are themselves
constituted in and through that discourse itself. Add to this the fact
that the discourse is itself dynamic and contingent and, therefore, never
outside attempts at political appropriation, the hermeneutical exercise
becomes fraught with difficulty. The idea that there could be some au-
thoritative act of interpretation that fixed meaning in a final, incontesta-
ble or objective way becomes dubious, if not altogether oxymoronic.
None of this denies the possibility of meaning or widespread agree-
ment on the particular products of interpretive processes. Deconstruc-
tion does not destruct the idea or practice of meaning, but it does
disrupt any hermeneutical exercise that claims to offer standards of
decidability or closure. Deconstruction views meaning as always con-
testable. Meaning can never be a ground for discourse because dis-
course itself encloses meaning. Moreover, discourse is itself never a
grounding for anything, it is only a site or opportunity for interested
attempts at hermeneutical acquisition. Reading ends not with a final
affixing of meaning, but with a temporary undecidability.
25. See JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON
KNOWLEDGE (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984); STEPHEN K. WHITE,
POLITICAL THEORY AND POSTMODERNISM (1991).
26. JACQUES DERRIDA, SPURS: NIETZSCHE'S STYLES (Barbara Harlow trans.,
1978).
27. ALEXANDER POPE, AN ESSAY ON CRITICIsM 20 (Scholar Press 1970) (1711).
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As such, deconstruction calls into question not only the metaphysics
of interpretive presence, but the very idea of a metaphysics itself. The
tendency to use deconstruction within existing metaphysical
frameworks is to be studiously avoided. Deconstruction's task is not to
work within the extant matrix of interpretation, but to decenter, discon-
cert, destabilize and disorder that framework. While it is devoted to
exploring the revealed terrain of ambiguity, paradox and multiplicity,
deconstruction does not seek to emulate Nietzsche by reaching for "a
clamorous declaration of the antithesis."'2 8 Deconstruction's threat is
not its claim to produce alternative and unconventional meanings-
although it does that in abundance-but it is its unrelenting challenge
to the establishment of authoritative claims of meaning. It rejects en-
tirely the notion of meaning as property that can be circulated in
perpetuity between authors and readers. Reading ends not in a final
affixing of meaning, but in a temporary respite from a lasting
undecidability.
An example of deconstructive technique can be found in its excava-
tion and implosion of 'woman.' While deconstruction works to
destabilize and decenter the notion of woman, showing how it attains
meaning in relation to 'man' and how man relies upon its opposite for
meaning. It does not strive to counter-balance or invert the traditional
hierarchy between males and females. On the contrary it exposes the
dichotomy in order to junk it rather than rejig it. It does not switch
around or reverse patriarchal authority and female submission and cre-
ate a matriarchal society. Instead it calls into question the very opposi-
tional' and contradictory framework within which such categories are
framed and differentiated. Trying to break the spell of metaphysics, it
aims for disruption and displacement rather than nihilism and nega-
tion. The ambition is to become iconoclasts rather than idolaters of an
inverted humanism.2 9
In adopting such a stance, the understanding of what 'the death of
the author' means and its implications take on a very different hue. In-
deed, its most significant consequence is that the death of the author
does not give birth to the autocratic life of the reader.3 0 The image of
28. DERRIDA, supra note 26, at 95; Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX.
L. REV. 373 (1981-82).
29. See JULIA KRISTEVA, ABOUT CHINESE WOMEN 14 (Anita Barrows trans.,
1977).
30. An extreme example of this notion of the discriminating reader is offered by
Alfred E. Housman:
Textual criticism, like most other sciences, is an aristocratic affair, not
communicable to all men, nor to most men. Not to be a textual critic is no
reproach to anyone, unless he pretends to be what he is not. To be a
textual critic requires aptitude for thinking and willingness to think ....
Knowledge is good, method is good, but one thing beyond all others is
necessary; and that is to have a head, not a pumpkin, on your shoulders,
and brains, not pudding, in your head.
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the scepter of divinely-sanctioned authority being passed along the her-
meneutical line is misleading. The challenge to hermeneutical author-
ity and the notion of subjectivity as a fixed, unified and bounded
identity applies equally to the new-crowned reader. Embedded in a
constitutive discourse of power, readers are also disciplined by the ex-
tant protocols of power-they are subjects in subjection. There is
neither a transcendent author nor a transcending reader. Lives can
never be recovered or understood in their entirety: they can never be
placed outside of history nor put beyond interpretation in history.
The death of the author is the effect of an anti-metaphysical conta-
gion that attacks all claims to hermeneutical authority, including the
designation of an empowered reader as the seat of interpretive power.
The reader is no more free (nor no less constrained) to confer meaning
and effect closure than the author. The text always says more than the
author and reader can determine or dictate. In the same way that "[the
author] cannot choose to write what will not be read,'" 3 1 the reader cannot
choose not to read what has not been written. The reader is no more
an originator than the author. In reading as in writing, there is always
the inescapable element of the parasitic or the plagiarized. Situated in
and sanctioned by an informing context, authoritative readers are also a
projection of the same metaphysics that breathes life into the idea of
the creative author: each is a cultural, historical and political construct
rather than a natural category.
In this regard, Foucault's insight about the death of the author is
more postmodern than Barthes'; it is less literal and more revolution-
ary. He did not allow what had been thrown out the front door to gain
access through the back door. In his famous essay,3 2 Foucault's target
was not the writer as such, but the attempted conversion of that histori-
cal figure into a metaphysical entity. The transformation of the writer
into an author is itself an authoritative projection. In searching to es-
tablish new ways of reading, Foucault sought to efface or abolish the
author and to negate interpretation as an exercise in re-presenting
someone's mind in textual form. For him, the text is not a crystal win-
dow through which the light of experience can shine. On the contrary,
the text's meaning is not the product of anything but the text itself. If
anything, the author is an artefact of the text. In making this critique,
Foucault's objective was decidedly not to hand over hermeneutical
power to the reader. Like the author, the reader cannot be a firm foun-
dation for hermeneutical authority as the reading subject is the product
of discourse as much as its producer. The reading subject is as impli-
cated in the powerful webs of social discourse as the writing subject:
ALFRED E. HOUSMAN: SELECTED PROSE 150 (John Carter ed., 1961).
31. ROLAND BARTHES, THE PLEASURE OF THE TEXT 1I (Richard Miller trans.,
1975).
32. See FOUCAULT, supra note 6.
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the distance between the two is historical and, therefore, is itself un-
breachable in any final or fixed manner.
For Barthes, the death of the author released readers from the au-
thor's overbearing influence and allowed them to revel in the enumera-
ble pleasures of the text and its intoxicating brio. Henceforth, the
author could only be an occasional guest at the hermeneutical party
whose invitations were jealously rationed by the liberated readers. If
there was any unity in the Barthian text, it would lie "not in its origin,
but in its destination. ' 3 3 Released from the dead hand of its writing,
readers were resurrected to engage in a practical collaboration with the
text and to sample its playful possibilities.
In the Foucaultian order of things, the writer as an historical figure
remains relevant: its particular importance and role will shift and vary
with the task at hand. There is no Theory of Interpretation that can
govern or underwrite the particular interpretation of specific texts.
Texts only mean in the concrete settings; theoretical understandings
about the significance of the writing and reading contexts are part of
that setting. The text can never be read in its own abstraction or gener-
ality, but must always be read against and within the complex codes of
power in which they arise and are attended to.3 4 There is no vantage-
point available from which to survey those codes that is itself not polit-
ical. As Shakespeare's Coriolanus said, "as if a man were of himself/
and knew no other kin."'3 5 In this way, meaning is always to be argued
for and never to be argued from. It is neither a sacred shard of
archaeological excavation nor an ephemeral whim of narcissistic
indulgence.
V. WRITERS AND READERS
If deconstruction relieves authors of the burden of authority,
postmodernism reminds readers of the weight of context. The decon-
structive critique strips away false claims to hermeneutical authority
wherever and whenever they arise. This is done not to deny forever the
possibility of meaning, but to defer and problematize meaning for all
time. Having cleared away the metaphysical brush, postmodernism re-
locates the interpretive exercise into its historically open and openly
historical setting. While notions of Author, Text and Interpreter
wither and die on the vine, writers, writing and readers are nourished
and come to life in the rich soil of social living.
Within such an understanding, it becomes possible to grasp, as Fou-
cault intimated, that it does matter who is speaking. But it does so in a
way that is very different to the traditional view. Who is speaking is not
33. Barthes, supra note 3, at 148.
34. See HENRY L. GATES, JR., WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 16 (1986).
35. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, CORIOLANUS act 5, sc. 3.
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a matter of indifference. The difference that difference makes is differ-
ent than is conventionally thought. The person who speaks cannot
control what is heard or understood and how it is heard or understood.
Nonetheless what might make a difference to that hearing or under-
standing is who is speaking and who is hearing. But that difference is
not metaphysical or ontological, it is political and historical. Nothing
necessarily follows from the political identity or historical location of
the speaker or hearer. Certainly, there is no necessary connection be-
tween the speaker's intentions and the meaning of what is said; the idea
of authorial authority is consigned to the trash can of failed academic
theories. However, the social identity and historical placing of who
speaks and who listens is not completely irrelevant or of no effect. The
practice of speaking will not cease to be an intentional act and its status
will demand attention as such. As Jacques Derrida put it, intention
"will have its place, but from that place it will no longer be able to
govern the entire scene and system of utterance."13 6 The nature, sali-
ence and consequence of that intention will always be open to interpre-
tation and re-interpretation, but it will never be the final word of
interpretation. In contrast to traditional understandings of hermeneu-
tical practice, deconstruction aims to problematize rather than priori-
tize any claim to authoritative interpretation. To ignore entirely the
fact that someone is speaking and from somewhere is as much a mistake as
depending exclusively on who is speaking to determine meaning.
Accordingly, while the dead Author must remain buried and the
lively Interpreter must not be brought to life, the writer and the reader
can remain vibrant figures on the interpretive terrain. They are acting
participants in the meaning-giving process. They do not stand astride
the enterprise, but comprise and are constituted by it. Interpretation is
not a static act that places the authoritative seal of hermeneutical ap-
proval on a finished textual product. Instead, it is a fluid and dynamic
negotiation that re-makes the text to be interpreted in the very act of
interpretation. Moreover, that interpretive engagement is situated in a
historical context that is itself never outside the interpretive engage-
ment. On such a theory and practice of interpretation, meaning is less
a piece of property to be surveyed and filed in an authoritative register
and more a fire that, constantly stoked by the timber of life, illuminates
a sense of wonder in its flames. Interpretation might burnish in writers'
and readers' hearts, not their minds, a fiery vision bright that melts the
cold charms of the traditional hermeneutical enterprise. On the far
side of meaning, it might be possible for future generations of writers
and readers to establish an interpretive practice which will have relin-
quished the urge to locate truth and fix meaning. It will be more inter-
ested in cultivating fresh insights and stimulating further senses of
wonder.
36. Jacques Derrida, Signature Event Context, 1 GLYPH 172, 192 (1977).
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By deflating the pretensions of any contending candidate for inter-
pretive honors, a postmodern deconstruction roots out privilege and
reveals it as a masquerade for expertise. However, it does not pretend
to wipe the historical text clean and bestow untrammeled scrawling
rights on allcomers. Each practical act of interpretation implies a par-
ticular theoretical understanding of interpretation. Such a theory takes
a stand, provisional and contingent, on the contested writings of au-
thors, texts, contexts and the like. Because there is not only never an
ending to the interpretive responsibility, there is also never a beginning
that can act as stable foundation on which to build. Nevertheless, the
identity of the author or reader may assume interpretive significance at
different times and in different ways.
This point can be neatly made by reference to the relation between
Foucault and his own seminal essay. For instance, the question may
arise as to whether I have given a fair/objective/correct/valid/et cetera
reading to Foucault's essay. Apart from the obvious ironies of this in-
quiry, there are some pertinent lessons to be learned from it. First of
all, provided that I have acted in good faith, the nature of such a chal-
lenge is beside the point in terms of the postmodern understanding
that I have offered. The merit of an interpretation is not judged by its
formal approximation of faithfulness to some model of interpretive in-
tegrity, but by its usefulness and power to illuminate the task at hand.
As Foucault himself may have concluded, "the only valid tribute to
thought . . . is precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it grown and
protest. ' '3 7 To think or interpret otherwise is to fall back on the dis-
credited and defunct idea that there is a metaphysical distinction be-
tween explication and creation that can be made and is worth
defending. Consequently, any challenge to my interpretation will be,
like the interpretation itself, as much a matter of politics as anything
else. Not that this reduces interpretation to only politics, but only that
interpretation can never be meaningfully understood apart from poli-
tics which, of course, is itself always open to interpretation and never a
ground for anything. 38
Secondly, it is instructive to take Foucault's arguments on the role
of the author and turn them back on himself as the author of his own
text. It is important not for hermeneutical authority, but for political
reception. The fact that Foucault was gay helps place his work in some
perspective for some purposes. It suggests a context for understanding
his work as a revolt against the repressive force of 'normalization' and
for explaining his preoccupation with the social construction of sexual-
ity. However, it does not offer any magical key to the meaning of that
work nor does it inhibit any particular reading of it. It is a contextual
37. Michel Foucault, Prison Talk, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE 93 (Colin Gordon ed. &
Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 92-93.
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fact whose relevance and significance will vary. Such a double reading
of Foucault's life and his oeuvre is nicely offered by Didier Eribon:
Obviously, one cannot pretend that Foucault's entire work is explained
by his homosexuality, as certain american Academics do, imagining,
moreover, that this would be enough to discredit it.... Quite simply,
it is possible to see how an intellectual project is born in an experience
that should perhaps be described as primary; how an intellectual ad-
venture is created in the struggles of individual and social life-not to
remain stuck in them, but to think them through, to go beyond them,
to problematize them by ironically turning the question back on those
who level it. Do you really know who you are? Are you so sure of your
reason? 39
VI. INTO THE AUTHENTIC
Almost everyone has received (and/or given) the advice given by
Shakespeare's Polonius to his son Laertes on his leaving home-don't
get into debt; choose your friends carefully; dress appropriately-and
similar sober sentiments. But the real sting is in the tale-"this above
all: to thine own self be true, /And it must follow, as the night the day,
/Thou canst not then be false to any man." 40 Both prosaic and
profound, puzzling and platitudinous, it is the kind of loving direction
that is self-evidently true, but that tends to raise more questions than it
can answer. What is this "self"? What would it be for it to be "thine
own"? What would it mean to be "true" to it? By way of suggesting its
own answer, it suggests that the search for identity is very much a back-
ward-looking expedition of discovery rather than a forward-acting ad-
venture of (re)creation.
In modernist discourse, an identity is something that each person
has by virtue of their existence as unique individuals. At its most ex-
treme and historical, there still seems to persist the idea that each sub-
ject is born normatively full-grown, like Zeus' children, with a raw set of
values, preferences and characteristics that can be more or less given
expression to in the historical act of living and socializing. For in-
stance, women are marked by their biology and it is for society to or-
ganize affairs in such a way that they can be truly women and express
the essence of their female being. Under this view, freedom is the suc-
cessful resolution of both the search for that true intrinsic identity that
lies within and the struggle to live one's life in accordance with its dic-
tates. In both its vulgar libertarian and Marxist guise, justice is reached
when people attain an unimpeded sense of themselves: false conscious-
ness is so much old clothing to be discarded in the unveiling of the true
self. On a more enlightened modernist version of identity, society
plays a more formative role, but is still secondary to the givenness of a
39. DIDIER ERIBON, MICHEL FOUCAULT 28 (Betsy Wing trans., 1991).
40. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 3.
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particular identity. Either way, the identity is a given quality that must
be perceived and preserved.
By contrast, postmodernism rejects the notion of an abiding, fixed
or essential identity. Identity is relative, not intrinsic; fluid, not fixed;
perspectival, not neutral; and protean, not perfected. 4' The subject is a
cultural creation, not a biological given. Nevertheless, while people are
not fundamentally fixed by their experience of race, gender and class,
they are distinctively marked by such social categorizations: "Identity is
in the etched details of mediated lives and struggle."'4 2 Like history,
identity cannot be completely got out of or into: its presence is never
entirely self-present to itself so that it can be summarily embraced or
evaded. Always shifting and often self-contradictory, identity is part of
history, not a ground or precondition for attempts to resist or reinforce
history's meaning.
If there is no Knowledge or Truth, there is also no Identity that is
unchangeable or beyond re-interpretation. Of course, there are lots of
identities, but not one Identity. At any particular time or place, individ-
uals will feel acutely the pushes and pulls of their identity. Being con-
tingent and in flux, the experience is no less real or limiting. To think
or postulate otherwise would be to deny and invalidate the racial and
gendered oppression of many. But accepting the experiences of racism
and sexism as true and real does not deliver a fatal blow to the anti-
essentialist project. Postmodernism does not denigrate or dismiss the
value and truth of experience-that would be nonsensical. Instead,
what it does do is avoid essentializing its value or truth. That experi-
ence is given historical force by interrogating it and resisting the mod-
ernist temptation to reduce it to a new authoritative source of
epistemological knowledge. 43 In this way, the subject becomes a site
for the constant and continuing struggle to take on an identity that is
conducive to a truly egalitarian society. Notions like subjectivity, false
consciousness, experience and personal destiny need not be jettisoned
as so much excessive baggage in the postmodern portmanteau, but are
retained in a fresh and revitalized shape and substance. In particular,
postmodernists suggest that the traditional notion of authenticity-"to
thine own self be true"-is an immediate patient for postmodern
surgery.
The political implications of this interpretive retooling are wide-
41. See generally Hutchinson, supra note 11; MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE
DIFFERENCE (1990).
42. Nancie E. Caraway, The Challenge and Theory of Feminist Identity Politics:
Workingon Racism, 12 FRONTIERS 109, 111 (1991).
43. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking To The Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REv. 323, 324-25 (1987). In her more recent work,
Matsuda seems to have put any essentialism behind her. See Mari J. Matsuda,




ranging, but themselves are never beyond contestation or interpreta-
tion. However, the challenge to the conventional idea of autonomy as a
negatively defined zone of non-interference and self-realization is espe-
cially strong. It gives the theoretical lie to the practical understanding
that freedom is an individual state of mind and passive virtue which
aspires to transcend social constraints. Instead, a postmodern insight
reconfigures individual freedom more as a public project than a private
undertaking: it is as much a social state of affairs as anything else. In
short, postmodernism is devoted to "deconstructing the self who could
embody that freedom."'4 4 Accordingly, the achievement of freedom
comes to look less like a session of personal therapy and more like a
social project to multiply the opportunities to transform oneself.
However, rather than go on at length and in the abstract about this
different idea of freedom and identity, it is more instructive (and
postmodern) to situate my discussion in continuing debates and engage
specific renditions of freedom and identity's conceptual re-constitution.
For this purpose, I will take up Patricia Cain's recent essay on feminist
jurisprudence and lesbian experience. 4 5 It is a particularly appropriate
piece to study because not only does it provide a convincing critique of
feminist theory's tendency, at best, to marginalize lesbians and, at
worst, to render them invisible. But, more than that, it claims to do so
as an exercise in postmodern thinking. Like Cain, I want to engage in a
constructive conversation rather than attempt to deliver a critical mon-
ologue. My objective is to contribute to her demolition of
homophobia, not to impede the progress of that task. However, I want
to focus on her very grounded and, therefore, troubling notion of au-
thenticity. It is not simply that her almost ontological use of authentic-
ity is inconsistent with her postmodern professions, but that such a
reliance might weaken rather than strengthen her political campaign.
Throughout, my overriding purpose is not to quibble with Cain, but to
explore and develop the effect of a postmodern reconstruction.
For Cain, at the heart of feminist legal theory is the claim that the
female experience must be taken seriously as an alternative to the dom-
inant male perception of reality. But, in so doing, it is imperative that
feminists must studiously avoid simply privileging another critical (fe-
male) standpoint of reality "into a new all-encompassing version of re-
ality."'4 6 She is thoroughly postmodern in insisting that it is not enough
to argue that women are different from men, but that the extra step
must be taken of recognizing and understanding the differences among
women. The lived experience of women is neither abstract nor univer-
sal and cannot be reduced to theories of "woman as mother" and "wo-
44. JOHN McGOWAN, POSTMODERNISM AND ITS CRITICS 211 (1991).
45. Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1989).
46. Id. at 211.
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man as sexual subordinate. ' 4 7 Differences of race, class and sexuality
must be understood and incorporated into any feminist ethic. 1I par-
ticular, feminists must challenge the institution of heterosexuality so as
to overcome lesbian invisibility and marginality. At important junc-
tures, Cain's text is resoundingly postmodern:
Postmodern thought challenges notions such as objectivity and univer-
sality. The post-modern "knowing self" is subjective, concrete and
particular, constructed through the lived experiences of the subject.
From a postmodern perspective, feminist theory is inadequate when
limited by the perception that there is one essential commonality
among all women .... Good feminist theory ought to reflect the real
differences in women's realities, in our lived experiences. These in-
clude differences of race, class, age, physical ability, and sexual
preference.
Postmodern legal theorists will want to reject the limitations caused
by any categorization. Although they will want to listen to the reality of
lesbian experience, these theorists will not be inclined to build a grand
theory based on the concept of "woman" as "lesbian."'4 8
Cain's critique of feminist jurisprudence as a modernist effort to
ground an emancipatory project in the categorical experience of "wo-
man" is compelling and cogent. The failure to deconstruct the female
identity sufficiently so to abandon its implicit heterosexual generality is
highlighted as being beneficial to the interests of some women, but det-
rimental to the liberatory goals of others. Nevertheless, there is a sub-
theme that runs strongly through the essay that compromises her com-
mitment to postmodernism. In effect, Cain wants to validate the lived
reality of lesbians through resort to the "authentic self." This would
not be so puzzling and non-postmodern a move if she saw authenticity
as a fluid and forward-achieving practice rather than a fixed and back-
ward-looking recovery. Of course, reliance on authenticity is not sus-
pect in itself: such a concept has an important role to play in any
radical theory of personal politics. But she manages to use "the au-
thentic self" as the metaphysical ground from which to reject and
render illegitimate other claims to grounding, feminist and non-femi-
nist, as viable options for theoretical alliances and political allegiances.
This is a very suspect move in the postmodern playbook.
As a postmodernist, I do not contend that "[s]o long as patriarchal
dominance continues, female authenticity is presumably impossible,'' 4 9
or that women might "have glimpses of [their] own authenticity even
47. Id. at 203 (citing Robin West,Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1988)). See Clare Dalton, Where We Stand: Observations on the Situation of Feminist
Legal Thought, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1988); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); West, supra.
48. Cain, supra note 45, at 204-05 (footnote omitted).
49. Id. at 193.
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within the patriarchy." 50 If by this, Cain means that the hegemony of
patriarchy prevents women from fully developing or constructing the
experience and practice of an authentic self, I am in full agreement.
However, when she insists that "[r]ebellion (even if it is a minor form of
sabotage) is self-affirming in its defiance of the inauthentic self that is
thrust upon us,'" 5' she is appealing to a much more grounded and
modernist understanding of authenticity. For her, authenticity pro-
vides the justificatory foundation from which to launch the struggle
against homophobia:
First of all, I believe that we each have an authentic self that is
unique and that it is a moral goal to act in accord with that authentic
self.
Furthermore, I believe the patriarchal structure of society prevents
women from attaining a sufficient concept of their individual authentic
selves....
I associate the concept of "authenticity" with other existentialists,
such as Martin Heidegger and Jean Paul Sartre .... We are morally
responsible when we choose freely and self-consciously. We act in
"bad faith" when we attempt to avoid the responsibility of freedom,
when we deny the existence of self as subject and instead act according
to an objective role created for us-or, indeed, whenever we choose on
the basis of something outside "self," including on the basis of an ab-
stract moral principle.
"Authenticity," in the sense that I use it, is necessarily connected
with freedom. I, as an individual woman, will have glimpses of my au-
thenticity whenever I am freed from the category woman; that is, when-
ever I am able to transcend my socially constructed (and unauthentic)
self.52
This sketch of freedom is not postmodern in character or ambition.
It lapses back into the modernist vocabulary of retrieving, uncovering
and transcending. It is very individualistic and conservatizing in scope.
She puts deconstruction in the service of a modernist ethic that is de-
voted to the liberation of a pre-social self that is prevented from truly
expressing itself until the gag of social experience is untied. This
comes close to the essentialist line of treating biology as destiny. In
saying this, I do not challenge the lived experience and reality of lesbi-
ans. Like Cain (and particularly as a heterosexual man), I believe that
everyone should be "careful to listen to women when they describe the
harms they experience as women." 53 Yet, I also believe, again like
Cain, this must be done so that "we are likely to get the legal theory
right (i.e., perceive the problem correctly and propose the right solu-
50. Id. at 194 (footnote omitted).
51. Id. at 193 n.9.
52. Id. at 194 n.10 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 195.
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tions). ' ' 54 Furthermore, and again like Cain, I believe that postmodern-
ism is pertinent to that objective. Consequently, I suggest that "the
search for the authentic self" will only be "a worthwhile goal ' 55 if that
search is understood more as a social undertaking to ensure the options
for choosing to become a particular identity are multiplied and the
choice to assume a particular lifestyle and way of being is fully and
equally respected.
The political hazards of the modernist mentality is particularly evi-
dent in Cain's references to gay men. For her, because heterosexuality
is a central dimension of the male view of reality, the lesbian experience
is especially important for the formation of feminist theory. True as
this may be, her argument runs the real risk of essentializing and, there-
fore, misapprehending maleness. Indeed, she goes so far as to say that
"male homosexuality is a practice that contradicts the assumption of
universal heterosexuality, but it affirms male-centered reality."' 56 Yet
this surely denies the lived experience of many gay men. In a world of
almost compulsory heterosexuality, their reality is equally marginal and
invisible. While they do obtain the benefits of being male in a patriar-
chal society, they only do so if they are prepared to disguise their de-
sired identities as gay men. By coming out, they forego the privileges
and protections of a heterosexual identity. Moreover, the tendency to
postulate "man" as an homogenous other is to make the same error
that Cain rightly chastises many feminists for in their tendency to gen-
eralize and prioritize one female view of reality. Gay men are different
to heterosexual men in much the same way as Cain concludes that les-
bians and Black women are different to heterosexual and white women:
-[t]o claim that lesbians are the same as heterosexual women or that
Black women are the same as white women is to fall into the assimila-
tionist/essentialist trap."'57
From such a postmodern understanding of identity, perennial diffi-
culties over false-consciousness and agency are given a very different
spin. The problems do not so much disappear, but are re-problema-
tized and given a fundamental reorientation. As Pierre Schlag ob-
serves, "We cannot deny our own agency .... We can call agency into
question, and we had better, but to call it into question is also to
(re)affirm, (re)create, (re)construct it. ' '5 8 False consciousness becomes
less of a mask that must be pried off to reveal the true identity of its
wearer and more of a situational impediment that stymies efforts at col-
lective and personal transformation. Although thoroughly situated,
54. Id.
55. Id. at 194 n.10.
56. Id. at 192 n.l.
57. Id. at 207.




subjects are not entirely saturated. Indeed, the postmodern re-formu-
lation of identity invigorates the subject as an emancipatory agent and
contributes to the likelihood of social renovation. Postmodernism calls
into question liberalism's fixation with the strong subject and its pre-
sumed lightness of social being. It does not problematize agency and
politics so as to abandon them. On the contrary, by re-locating subjects
in their constitutive culture, it hopes to embolden agents in their polit-
ical awareness and empowerment. Rather than start with the repressed
individual and strive for hermeneutical liberation, postmodernism chal-
lenges the bourgeois format of society.5 9 It aims to reorganize itself in
line with the radical imperatives of an experimental democracy that rec-
ognizes the systemic and social character of oppression at the same
time that it facilitates provisional, revisable, yet real responses to the
alleviation of suffering. 60
VII. A MATrER OF IDENTITY
Trite learning is easily and quickly forgotten. In a manner of speak-
ing, there is no point in jumping out of the frying pan into the fire
because the metaphysical heat will remain the same. Moreover, it will
tend to consume anything but the liberal in its essentialist flames. It is
better to switch to an alternative source of postmodern energy alto-
gether. Little is to be gained in any long-term struggle by deconstruct-
ing, for example, 'man' in order to replace it by the universal
hermeneutical of 'woman.' There is no generic Woman (or Man) be-
cause biological attributes and sexual characteristics are experienced
and interpreted differently by different women under different circum-
stances. 'Woman' has no primary or essential identity. Consequently,
in the hermeneutical process, nothing necessarily follows from the fact
of female authorship or readership. There is no one experience of be-
ing woman and their are no necessary truths that can be deduced from
nor directed onto that experience. Because Catharine MacKinnon/
Phyllis Schafly is a woman, not all women are Catharine MacKinnon/
Phyllis Schafly. As a collective or personal undertaking, lives can never
be recovered or understood in their abstract generality or originality.
Being never not situated in social history, they can never be fixed and
placed beyond re-interpretation in social history. Identity guarantees
nothing.
But this does not mean that identity does not matter. It matters
majorily: it simply does not do so in the essentialist or metaphysical
manner that is traditionally thought. Identity's significance is political
59. Eugene D. Genovese, Review Essay, Critical Legal Studies as Radical Politics
and World View, 3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 131 (1991).
60. See Cornel West, The Limits of:Veopragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1747 (1990);
Allan C. Hutchinson, A Poetic Champion Composes: Unger (Not) on Ecology and Women,
40 U. Toronto L.J. 271 (1990).
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and all the more significant for that. The relation between persons and
their contexts is like that between writers and texts-nothing necessarily
follows. Context is not the author of the person in the sense of inhib-
iting, binding, or constraining its identity. It is relevant, but not deter-
minative. Similarly, while it is never possible to pin down context in
any fixed or finished way, so it is not possible to isolate authorial iden-
tity and, therefore, the meaning of the text from that author.
By divesting identity of its spurious claim to metaphysical authority,
it is released to play a more important and less confined role in textual,
sexual, racial and any other politics. Identity becomes a site that, while
guaranteeing nothing, makes everything possible. By moving beyond
the debilitating politics of abstraction and ahistoricality, postmodern-
ism looks to create meaning and knowledge in the situated particulars
of embedded experience. The ambition is not to fix an all-encompass-
ing Truth in a distant metaphysical realm, but to pay constant attention
to the multiple truths and contextual details of engaged living in the
here-and-now. 6' Of course, being political, that process will always be
open and fluid; meaning will always be provisional and revisable.
Moreover, by using rich accounts and critical readings of historical ex-
perience to promote political knowledge and action, that politics will
always be contestable: politics itself can never be a privileged ground
for anything.
For instance, Patricia Cain relates an incident in which a lesbian col-
lege teacher sought to establish a course on "The Outsider in Twenti-
eth Century Literature." Her colleagues dismissed summarily the
notion that an author's sexuality-living as an outsider in a heterosex-
ual culture-is an important aspect of her writing. While they recog-
nized that it might impact on her writing, it was no different than a
thousand other likely influences. 6 2 If the counter-claim is that sexuality
is the most important factor in a lesbian's writing, it is as mistaken as
the view that it is of no consequence at all. Like everything else, its
importance will vary and depend upon the historical context and psy-
chological framework in which the work was written and read. Nothing
necessarily follows from a person's sexuality. To reduce writings to
only their sexuality is as limiting as ignoring it entirely. Like everyone
else, lesbians are never only lesbians and to impose such a straight-
jacket upon them is to reinforce, not release them from, their status as
outsiders. A constant and careful attention to contexts is the least (and
the most) that can be expected. This will not provide a final resolution,
but will leave the question open for renegotiation and reinterpretation.
61. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581 (1990); Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1699 (1990).
62. See Cain, supra note 45, at 206-07 (citing Elly Bulkin, Kissing/Against the Light:
A Look at Lesbian Poetry, in LESBIAN STUDIES 40-41 (M. Cruikshank ed., 1982)).
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The who's, when's, where's, why's and wherefore's of writing and read-
ing will always be contestable. Written in an irretrievable whirl of social
circumstances and personal intentions and read (and re-read) in a simi-
lar flux, meaning's only destiny is to be multiple and irresolvable.
VIII. SPIKING THE CANON
In recent years, many scholars have turned their attention to the
relation of law and literature. Although the primary focus has been
upon efforts to establish an appropriate hermeneutic for the legal en-
terprise, there have been ideological maneuvers to inculcate the values
of the so-called great works of literature. In this endeavor, the con-
tested questions of authority, identity and authenticity have played an
important, if understated role. A practitioner of such an approach and
leading culprit is Richard Posner. 63 Contrary to initial impressions, this
is not a new departure for him, but is the continuation of his basic juris-
prudential project by more subtle means-a way of distinguishing law
from ideology and establishing the Rule of Law's enduring values. In
short, his study of law and literary theory operates as a rousing affirma-
tion of that normative tradition. It is not the fact that Posner's and
similar work comprises an ideological program that is objectionable,
but the hidden and offensive nature of an ideology that bears a striking
resemblance to the European cultural tradition of elite individualism. 64
For Posner, literature is as much to be revered as read or, even bet-
ter, to be read reverentially. Like law, it is a treasured repository of a
traditional wisdom that has been accumulated and passed down
through history. Although they arise in particular situations, in particu-
lar places and in particular times and involve particular people, law and
literature identify and address the enduring questions of human exist-
ence. The answers that they give manage to transcend those particular-
ities and achieve an almost timeless quality. Lawyers and literary critics
become the stewards of this cultural heritage, taxed with the responsi-
bility and privilege of protecting and promoting its ideals and aspira-
63. POSNER, supra note 15.
64. There have, of course, been other critiques of the link between Posner's
literary and legal work. However, these tend to dull the ideological edge of any
critique and cut at a much more abstract level. See Stanley Fish, Don't Know Much
About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law and Literature, 97 YALE L.J. 777 (1988);James B.
White, What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 2014 (1989);
Robin L. West, Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast, 39 MERCER L. REV.
867 (1988). Rather than identify the particular class, gender and racial implications
in Posner's work, they are content to argue over his reductionist, unidimensional
and simplistic representation of human nature's complexities. See Robin L. West,
Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of
Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985); James B. White,
Economics and the Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 TENN. L. REV. 161 (1986). While
these criticisms are not to be trivialized, they tend to share the ahistoricality and
classlessness that mar Posner's work.
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tions. By attending to these totemic texts of law and literature, Posner
maintains that individuals can give humble recognition to the universal-
ity of human nature and their own precious, but flawed attempts at its
realization. Sharing a fate and a future with earlier generations, mod-
ern society can join its ancestors in working towards a lasting achieve-
ment of the good life.
The problem with Posner's canonization of literature is that, far
from resulting in a "body of writings that are somehow able to speak to
people living under other skies, in other times," 65 it actually privileges
and authorizes only one particular cultural heritage. In Law and Litera-
ture,66 he mentions over 50 books and discusses 34 of them. Among
this select group, there is only one written by a woman, none by a black
writer and only a few were written in the twentieth century. Like so
much of the law and literature approach, Posner's readings and rheto-
ric attempt to clothe some particular prejudices in the seductive trap-
pings of perpetuity and, thereby, to hide their ideological character. By
identifying a canonical archive of great books and urging their popular
consumption, he effects a cunning combination of authoritativeness
and humility. In the Posnerian scheme of things, devotion to such
traditional values becomes a natural sign of social solidarity rather than
a partisan act of ideological commitment. On close inspection, Pos-
ner's 'eternal verities' are revealed as ephemeral vanities: they are so
often the interested views of local commentators who happen to be in-
vested with contingent authority. As such, his own work falls into the
very trap against which he warns others: "the occupational hazard of
the 'literary lawyer' is putting literature to tendentious use."' 67 Posner's
mistake is not to exaggerate the fruits of literary study, but to suggest
that "it damages literature to press it into the service of political de-
bate."'68 His attempt to preserve literature as the domain which encom-
passes "the eternal problems of the human condition, not the specific
manifestations of those problems and the politics of our century" 69 is
itself a tendentious and dangerously political objective.
Of course, he is not alone in mistaking the literary outpourings of
an almost exclusively white, European, male, dead and upper middle-
class group of authors as cultural achievement par excellence that goes
beyond the local concerns of any particular culture or tribal tradition.
All circumstances of the literary canon's selection, production and dis-
semination are culturally-situated. Not only do they bolster the pres-
tige of certain largely local and contingent preoccupations, but they
65. Richard Posner, The Depiction of Law in The Bonfire of the Vanities, 98 YALE
L.J. 1653, 1661 (1989).
66. POSNER, supra note 15.
67. Id. at 175.
68. Id. at 356.
69. Id. at 357.
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exclude and devalue the experiences and interests of those with other
world views: absence is a very telling form of presence. Presented as a
tribute to and celebration of a common humanity, it is a troubling exer-
cise in cultural imperialism. Posner's understanding of culture is ex-
tremely limited and limiting. For him, culture tends to be largely static
and unchanging; any change is as seemingly ineluctable and im-
perceptible as glacial drift. Posnerian culture accumulates "eventually"
and "somehow" from popular and esoteric culture. 70 It is a process of
survival and competitive selection in the literary marketplace; the liter-
ary analogue of the market's invisible hand is at work. It is about the
building of walls and enclosures-admission being reserved for those
who come with a suitably respectful attitude and can trade in the cor-
rect moral coinage. In an important sense, Posnerian culture becomes
more a Palladian mausoleum than a civic meeting. It is a place where
people come to pay obeisance to departed heroes rather than a vibrant
venue for dynamic interaction and celebration among living citizens.
In the tradition of Matthew Arnold, Posner wants to encourage us to
work at "acquainting ourselves with the best that has been known and
said in the world, and thus with the history of the human spirit."'7 1 He
wants to promote the understanding that culture is out there for every-
one as long as they possess or are prepared to cultivate a refined sense
of cultural taste. But, once the notion of objective truth is abandoned
and replaced by an appreciation of culture's historical contingency,
Posner's claims begin to reveal themselves as partisan assertions mas-
querading as universal truths. He fosters the idea and practice of cul-
ture as a constitutive social force that is directed to ensuring the
hegemony of one paradigm of values over all other competing ideolo-
gies; it is a process of discrimination that simultaneously disen-
franchises those who are different and confirms the superiority of the
dominant tradition. As in the educational system through which such a
strategy of social control is implemented. the reinforcement of class
distinctions and the silencing of different voices is secured through the
learning of an enduring cultural tradition. 7 2
In the guise of aesthetic appreciation, Posner delivers a moral
homily for modern times: the cultural values of acclaimed aesthetic
performances are covertly affixed with the hallmark of cultural validity
and deemed worthy of social reproduction. 73 Even though the literary
canon of great books does contain some fine representations of artistic
elegance, it must be remembered that such stylistic attributes them-
70. Posner, supra note 65.
71. MATTHEW ARNOLD, LITERATURE AND DOGMA (1873).
72. See PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (1965); DUNCAN KENNEDY,
LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE
SYSTEM (1983); Michele Sola & Adrian T. Bennett, The Struggle for Voice: Narrative,
Literacy and Consciousness in an East Harlem School, 167 B.U. J. EDUC. 88 (1985).
73. See JOHN BRENKMAN, CULTURE AND DOMINATION 43-44 (1987).
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selves are considerably culture-specific. While literary form does not
drift free of cultural content, aesthetic approval is not entirely reducibie
to substantive correctness. Posner's chosen literature embroiders the
privileged motifs of ethnocentrism, racism, sexism and classism onto
the tapestry of human history, providing it with much of its vivid color
and special meaning. It is simply not the case that "no one is apt to
question the greatness of Homer or Dante or Shakespeare. 74
Whatever else it may be, the greatness of these texts cannot be entirely
separated from (nor totally reduced to) their brutal depiction of wo-
men, other races and religions, and the working masses.
The nature and circumstances of the prevailing literary canon have
emphasized one particular cultural heritage and the specific view of
human existence and worth that it celebrates and embodies. Posner's
attempted representation of it as a "coherent . . . unity ' 7 5 reinforces
the historical notion of continuity and the political value of homogene-
ity. It suggests an unbroken and unchanging tradition of accumulated
and shared wisdom that runs in a straight line from the ancient Greeks
to modern Americans. In particular, these great books are interpreted
to emphasize the virtues of individual achievement and sacrifice. As
with the appreciation of literature itself, history and society are simply
so many contexts to be transcended. Authorship and the completed
text is treated as an act of individual genius that is able to break the
bounds of its originating circumstances. Like the reader that the canon
helps to encourage and inspire, such books praise the value and pres-
ence of an individual mind outside particular discourses that should
struggle to establish intellectual engagements with other such minds.
Largely unconcerned with the pressing public and social issues of
the day, the so-called 'inner life' is prized: the torments of the soul and
intellect are paramount. For instance, pity and humility are treated as
abstract states of individual minds that warrant much more serious at-
tention than the actual material and collective conditions of human suf-
fering that give rise to such individual feelings and that are often
effaced by them. It is not the interest in the inner life that is troubling,
but the ontological privileging of the abstract and individual over the
material and the social: this encourages a public fatalism and an insen-
sitive privatism. Indeed, the overall picture, projected by a Posnerian-
style canon, is of individual citizens who ought to be compliant, dutiful,
and resigned, who place a premium on rational action, who take full
responsibility for their own feelings and actions, and who are entitled
to take individual pride in their achievements. 76
74. POSNER, supra note 15, at 72. For a rigorous challenge to that assumption,
see GAYATRI C. SPIVAK, IN OTHER WORLDS: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL POLITICS 15-29
(1987) and EAGLETON, supra note 23, at 1-52.
75. POSNER, supra note 15, at 354.
76. In advocating the preservation of the traditional literary canon and the
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To those less cloistered than Posner, it should come as no surprise
that existing relations of social domination are inscribed and perpetu-
ated within the cultural practices that comprise the production and re-
ception of literary works. A body of literature that is almost exclusively
produced by one group in society is likely to (and, in fact) does give
undue weight and significance to the interests and preoccupations of
that dominant group. The foisting of this cultural heritage upon all
groups within society is an act of imperial aggression that devalues the
cultural traditions of dominated and less dominant groups. The worth
of other cultural traditions that compete with and often contradict the
dominant culture is always evaluated and judged in terms of that domi-
nant culture. This reinforces the dominant and dominated's percep-
tions of themselves and prevents any suitable rapprochement. It is
essential that out-groups speak for themselves and analyze the condi-
tions of their domination and their possible transformation.
As such, for instance, black literature ought to be assessed and ap-
preciated in and on its own terms. It must not be judged purely against
the literary standards of the very tradition that it intends to challenge
and itself judge. The writings of James Baldwin, Frantz Fanon and Al-
ice Walker (to name but a few) must surely qualify for serious study.7 7
It is hypocritical and offensive to oblige black or native children to read
Shakespeare and Dante in order that they might think like them and
internalize their values so that they can be considered equal to the
white children of upper middle-class professionals. However, it is an
entirely different and more inspiring matter to work for a cultural envi-
ronment in which all children read, empathize with and inspire to write
like Baldwin, Fanon or Walker. The imperatives of cultural democracy
demand a combination of different texts with different ways of
reading. 78
The exclusion of women authors from Posner's literary canon raises
similar objections. The male view of the world inscribed in the canon
has prevailed not only by virtue of brute force, but also by being pro-
pounded and eventually accepted as a natural version of human experi-
ence. This has resulted in the trivialization and stigmatization of
women's experience as 'other' and the continuing reliance upon stere-
inculcation of its 'universal values,' Posner is not alone. This conservative call to
arms is being sounded and heard in other quarters of academia. In two
monographs of considerable popularity, Allan Bloom and Eric D. Hirsch, Jr.
indulge in very similar encomiums to elite values. See ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING
OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987); ERIC D. HIRSCH, JR., CULTURAL LITERACY: WHAT
EVERY AMERICAN NEEDS TO KNOW (1987).
77. See, e.g., JAMES BALDWIN, Go TELL IT ON THE MOUNTAIN (1952); JAMES
BALDWIN, ANOTHER COUNTRY (1962); FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS
(1967); ALICE WALKER, IN SEARCH OF OUR MOTHER'S GARDENS (1983).
78. See discussion supra part VII.
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otypical representations of women. 79 Moreover, such literary under-
standings have helped to institutionalize patriarchy as the organizing
principle of cultural and political arrangements. Although they can lay
a genuine historical claim to being truly enduring and sustaining, the
traditional reproductive and domestic spheres of women's activity have
been insufficiently explored and thereby undervalued: the world of
public affairs has been disproportionately glamorized and invested with
a distinctly sexist caste. As well as being ignored or marginalized, the
literary work of established women writers, like Virginia Woolf or Jane
Austen, has been interpreted in light of men's priorities. In the same
vein, others, like Mary Shelley, are primarily treasured for their eccen-
tricity or quirkiness. Consequently, some contemporary women's writ-
ing has presented itself as a self-conscious struggle to imagine different
ways of being in the world and transforming the inherited meanings of
that masculine world. 80
In making this plea for literary reappraisal in the name of cultural
diversity, it is important not to fall into the same essentialist trap that
ensnares Posner. Little headway is made by my construction of a uni-
versal 'other' to contrast with his universal 'one': a diluted homogene-
ity only reinforces and validates the invidious hierarchical ordering that
is the original target of criticism. Race, gender, ethnicity, religious be-
lief, age and class interact to create difference and caution against the
universalist tendency to conflate the condition of one group with the
condition of all. Domination has been perpetuated and rationalized
both by embracing difference (superiority of men over women and
whites over blacks) and by eschewing difference (treatment of women
as men and blacks as whites). 8 1 Consequently, a fully adequate account
of women's lives cannot be achieved by men or within a male-oriented
framework nor by privileging the experiences and theoretical apparatus
of one group of women.8 2 A commitment to cultural diversity demands
an interpretive matrix that can accommodate changing combinations of
sameness and difference, thereby encouraging a conceptual and cul-
tural heterogeneity.
It is simply mistaken for Posner to contend that "the English Ren-
aissance produced a richer literature than has twentieth century Eng-
land."'8 3 Unless, of course, he means by "richer" that they embody and
represent the esteemed values of a narrow cultural crime de la crime in a
79. See generally SANDRA M. GILBERT & SUSAN GUBAR, THE MADWOMAN IN THE
ATrIc: THE WOMAN WRITER AND THE 19TH CENTURY LITERARY IMAGINATION (1979);
JANET TODD, GENDER AND LITERARY VOICE (1980).
80. See, e.g., ADRIENNE RICH, THE DREAM OF A COMMON LANGUAGE (1978).
81. See Nitya Duclos, Lessons of Difference: Feminist Theory on Cultural Diversity, 38
BUFF. L. REV. 325 (1990).
82. See ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION
IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988).
83. POSNER, supra note 15, at 72.
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relatively homogeneous society. Although it might not fit neatly within
the restricted stylistic and substantive confines of the traditional canon,
the literature of the twentieth century is much culturally and politically
richer. By these more pluralistic lights, the literature of the seven-
teenth century is impoverished and conventional in its range and diver-
sity. The omission of black women's literature from inclusion in
Posner's canon underlines the cut and substance of its exclusionary ef-
fects; it trivializes and homogenizes the experiences of many and denies
them a voice and a hearing. For instance, the 'popular' writings of Toni
Morrison and Alice Walker offer vivid and wrenching accounts of the
sexual oppression of black women by their white masters and their
black relatives.8 4 These harrowing chronicles attest not only to the per-
vasiveness of human brutality, but to the injustices that arise through
the insistence on representing the world through essentialist categories
and overlooking difference, in this case the treatment of 'blacks' and
'women' as independent and self-contained identities. This kind of
modern fiction speaks to and, crucially, speaks from a more diverse and
sophisticated society that is no longer dazzled nor intimidated by the
dubious beacon of classical ideology. This lack of conforming com-
monality and cultural homogeneity is not a condition to be lamented,
but is a dynamic state of affairs that is to be carefully nurtured and gen-
erously supported.
In championing the case for a keener and more serious treatment of
modern literature, the intention is not to devalue entirely the literary
work that comprises the traditional canon: that would be the flip-side
of the same canonical coin. The aim must be to re-value it by situating
it within a less reverential and more rooted method of reading and in-
struction. Shakespeare and the other hallowed artists must be read and
understood as products of their own particular socio-cultural context.
Such textual re-valorization and the demonstration of their rootedness
will facilitate contemporary readers in grasping their own embedded-
ness and advance the popular struggle to progress socially within that
context of understanding.8 5 Apart from their historical interest, such
literary offerings will continue to merit and repay continued study as
long as and to the extent that they have something to say to a culturally
diverse and pluralistically tolerant society. In this sense, the fact of The
Merchant of Venice's anti-semitism or The Tempest's colonial imperialism is
not a reason in itself to refrain from their continued study, but it should
act as an urgent reminder of the need not to confuse aesthetic apprecia-
tion with cultural validity and to insist upon a critical mode of reading.
Contrary to Posner's advice, the best in literature is not a romantic
escape or transcendence from its concrete context, but is an engaged
84. See generally ALICE WALKER, THE COLOR PURPLE (1982); TONI MORRISON,
BELOVED (1987).
85. See SPIVAK, supra note 74, at 46-102.
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attempt to explore and illuminate that concrete structure's latent trans-
formative possibilities. Serious cultural artifacts do not betray human
suffering, but bear radical witness to its actual practice.8 6 In a culturally
diverse and politically progressive society, the ambition will be to nur-
ture those cultures that are presently overwhelmed by the dominant
culture and to maintain a multiplicity of cultures that are constantly
borrowing from each other and being constructed anew; it is not about
the transmission or imposition of a public monoliteracy over time. The
study of cultural texts is warranted as a learning exercise in critical
thinking rather a ceremonious act of intellectual genuflection. By in-
vesting particular literary works with the imprimatur of the universal,
Posner is able to sanction those endeavors and the values that they es-
pouse as a privileged mode of access to moral truth and knowledge.
Without such a restraining canon, he no doubt fears that the baneful
notion might be allowed to develop that there are no governing verities
and that each individual or cultural group within society can go its own
way.
IX. ON JUDGING
Mindful that it "is impossible, now more than ever, to disassociate
the work we do . . .from a reflection on the political or institutional
conditions of that work,"8 7 responsible lawyers should not turn a blind
eye to the literary twist in jurisprudential events. Instead, they should
reflect on and abandon its political elitism. Establishing an alliance be-
tween lawyers and the dispossessed might create public openings for
the dispossessed to reestablish their own culture in their own lives.
This, in turn, might enrich and transform the lives of lawyers. Different
cultures must be valued in themselves and not as quaint contrasts to
our own. Within this larger project, the contribution of the legal aca-
demic consists in working toward legal hermeneutics that is more dem-
ocratic and less aristocratic in its practices and principles.
What such a postmodern hermeneutics means for judging is, of
course, open to interpretation. But it does suggest certain intimations.
As the connection between identity and meaning is never fixed or
closed, nothing necessarily follows from the identity of thejudge. This
has a progressive spin. Solicitous to the circumstances of its release
and reception, a judgment cannot be reduced to its author's intentions
of identity. Even a crude grasp of legal history demonstrates that there
are ample judicial mavericks who managed to confound the expecta-
tions of all and sundry.
Yet none of this is to be taken to imply that women judges, black
86. See BRENKMAN, supra note 73, at 102-38; SEAMUS HEANEY, THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE TONGUE (1988).
87. Jacques Derrida, The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of Its Pupils,
13 DIACRITIcs 3, 3 (Catherine Porter & Edward P. Morris trans., 1983).
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judges or gay judges will not make a difference. It is that that difference
will be political, not metaphysical, in nature and consequence. While
there are not nor can there be any metaphysical certainties, the institu-
tional chances of transforming law and judging are greatly improved.
The appointment of women judges, black judges and gay judges will
increase the likelihood that a different perspective will be brought into
and to bear upon the adjudicative process. In the same way that there
is nothing to prevent white, male, heterosexual judges from acting to
transform themselves in the law, there is nothing to guarantee that
white judges, black judges and gay judges will not continue the existing
traditions of law and judging. But the fact is that the experience of
such traditional outsiders will work its way into the adjudicative exer-
cise and its doctrinal product. Moreover, their very existence within
the ranks of judicial authority might well have important political
consequences.
The impact of Thurgood Marshall on the American Supreme Court
has been enormous: his presence and self-identification as a black man
was a huge part of that impact. Yet this effect was never assured. While
Thurgood Marshall is a black man, not all black men are Thurgood
Marshall. The debacle over the appointment of Clarence Thomas un-
derlines this. In strictly doctrinal terms, there is nothing that Marshall did
that could not have been effected by a white judge, blessed with a simi-
lar political imagination and political will. However, it was the fact that
he did it that was important. His experience as a black man meant that
it was more likely (not certain) that he would understand and champion
the history and hopes of black Americans. It was more likely, because
of that experience, that he would possess the political vision that he
had. Moreover, it meant that his judgments would be more likely to be
received differently (in positive and negative ways) than that of white
judges. In short, the significance of his judicial career is not the result
of his ontological identity as a metaphysical Author and the hermeneu-
tical authority that his judicial text worked in sway of that fact. It is a
political story about a political writer in a political world whose signifi-
cation will always be political.
There are, of course, risks within such a deconstructive reading and
postmodern strategy. No political action can be vouchsafed and no
particular consequences can be assured. The major risk is that it will be
seen to harm the cause of racial, feminist or gay justice. By decon-
structing authorial authority and intention, it might be seen "to remove
the very levers against power at the moment [that] they have been
seized by those who have lacked them." 88 However, the hazards of
clinging to a modernist faith-for that is what it is-are much greater
88. Martha Minow, Partial Justice: Law and Minorities, in THE FATE OF LAw 58
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1991). For a full discussion of this
challenge, see Allan C. Hutchinson, Les Miserables Redux: Law and the Poor UJune
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and more damaging than the risk of taking the postmodern gamble. If
some special authenticity and derivative authority is to be bestowed
upon the black judge as black judge, there is no consistent or logical
way that the same authority cannot be claimed by the white judge as
white judge: consistency and logic are vital standards in the metaphysi-
cal almanac. In a world in which the vast majority of judges remain
white, male and heterosexual, this would be counter-productive for it
would undermine the excellent critical work done in prying judicial
texts free of their limiting authorial circumstances and making them
available for transformative reading. To return to the traditional her-
meneutical practice of author-based interpretation would be regressive.
It devalues and trivializes the crucial role of the black, feminist or gay
critic to that of ensuring a faithful decoding and technical retrieval.
Traditional hermeneutics has to leave the critic to stand obediently
aside and allow the authoritative voice of (white, male, heterosexual)
authorial experience to speak for itself in imparting Truth to the world.
This is a modernist trap that the postmodernist can help critics of
racism, sexism and homophobia avoid. There is little to be gained and
much to be lost in re-inscribing the epistemology of transcendence that
is the hallmark of traditional hermeneutics.8 9 The idea of transmitting
authentic human experience through a transparent textual medium for
direct and respectful consumption by the popular masses is a travesty
of the emancipatory project. By claiming authenticity and authority for
previously excluded voices in the name of a transformative politics, the
debilitating metaphysics of ontology are given precedence over the
politics of struggle. The authorial monarch is returned to power. Yet,
it is only in the dark kingdom of the blind that such one-eyed upstarts
can feign regal right. At best, the author is a puppet-monarch whose
every move is choreographed and staged by the dominant elite. The
triumph of a truly democratic politics will only occur when the author-
monarch is finally dead and a polity of truly equal readers and writers is
established and lived.
However, it is important to emphasize that a dismissal of objectivist
jurisprudence does not commit the postmodernist to a subjectivist ac-
count that reduces judging to "purely personal choice," a whimsical
exercise of capricious opinion or idiosyncratic invention. This depic-
tion of judging is merely the flip side of objectivism and to have any
theoretical bite depends upon the possible validity of an objectivist
epistemology in which there is only objective truth or subjective opin-
ion. In the deconstructive approach, traditional metaphysics is re-
jected; the death of the judicial Author does not give rise to the birth of
1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author), and infra text
accompanying notes 107-110.




the judicial Interpreter. For those who do work within such a para-
digm, the decision to criticize judges for their failure to follow and re-
spect the presumed objective truth of the constitution or the common
law carries some very harsh implications. The charge of indulging per-
sonal predilection suggests that, knowing the real truth of the law's
meaning in any particular instance, the judge made a calculated deci-
sion to deviate from it: this is tantamount to mala fides. Accordingly,
whenever mainstream critics admonish judges for using the wrong in-
terpretive method or applying it wrongly, they are accusing them of not
only being bad judges, but also being dishonest and irresponsible
judges.
On the other hand, a postmodern understanding of judging rejects
entirely this epistemological paradigm and, as such, accepts neither the
objectivist account ofjudging nor its subjectivist bere noire.90 Legal doc-
trine is not simply 'out there,' but is always in need of collective re-
trieval and re-creation. There can be no law without interpretation, no
interpretation without interpreters, and no interpreters without poli-
tics. Yet doctrine is not nothing, but a special kind of something that
has to be interpreted to mean anything. While there will be occasions
of Machiavellian manipulation, it is as mistaken to suggest that the
judge has complete interpretive freedom as it is to claim that the law
exerts complete interpretive control. The distinction between 'that to
be interpreted' and 'that who interprets' cannot be sustained: doctrine
and judges interact to shape each other in a contingent context of polit-
ical power. Contrary to most mainstream critics' views, judgment is
neither the intelligible articulation of objective truths nor the chaotic
fantasizing of subjective experience. Consequently, the postmodernist
is able to deny the idea of objective meaning and, at the same time, to
accept that judges largely act in good faith. While it incorporates the
judges' sense of felt boundedness, it exposes and challenges that deep
set of contestable values on which judges claim to rest their decisions.
X. IDENTITY POLITICS
Postmodernism does not provide an integrated or finished program
for political action. In the face of the problematized subject,
postmodernism does not capitulate to or retreat from the task of strug-
gling towards an enhanced social solidarity and experience of justice.
Instead, it points to a renewed engagement with and sustained chal-
lenge to existing historical conditions. By abandoning the search to
recover or fix a unified and pristine self, the hope is to empower sub-
jects by making them individually aware of their capacity for self-
(re)creation and collectively responsible for establishing a mode of so-
90. See Allan C. Hutchinson, That's Just the Way It Is: Langille on Law, 34 McGILL
L.J. 145 (1989).
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cial life that multiplies the opportunities for transformative action.
Postmodernism problematizes truth, individuals, agency and collective
action not to discard them from the radical vocabulary, but to render
them more immediately transformable and more politically useful.
However, the radical nature of the postmodern critique has caused
acute anxiety in some quarters and has come in for trenchant criticism.
The fear is that the postmodern turn will result, for instance, in femi-
nism being steered down a political blind alley in which transformative
energies will be exhausted in obsessive and paralysing odysseys in self-
consciousness raising. Eschewing all efforts at generalization and char-
acterization in favor of particularity and specificity, identity will be dis-
aggregated to such an extent that there will only be isolated and
unconnected individuals: "if generalization is only permitted in the ab-
sence of multiple inflexions or interpretive possibilities . .. [w]hat re-
mains is a universe composed entirely of counter-examples, in which
the way men and women see the world is purely as particular individuals,
shaped by the unique configurations that form that particularity." 91
Difference will have obliterated identity: race and gender will be little
more than theoretical figments of a diluted political experience. In
short, a liberal modernism will have reasserted itself courtesy of its
postmodern antagonist.
Many politicial activists have decided that the practical risks of
postmodernism are too great to warrant its theoretical embrace. With-
out a generalized identity as woman or black, there will be no place on
which to mobilize people, from which to establish a viable political chal-
lenge to existing oppressive conditions or towards which to direct
people:
If it is not a female subject who provides the normative model for a
feminist emancipatory politics, then what does? If we fail to recuperate
the subject in feminist terms, are we not depriving feminist theory of a
notion of agency that casts doubt on the viability of feminism as a nor-
mative model? Without a unified concept of woman or, minimally, a
family resemblance among gender-related terms, it appears that femi-
nist politics has lost the categorical basis of its own normative claims.
What constitutes the "who," the subject, for whom feminism seeks
emancipation? If there is no subject, who is left to emancipate?92
This fear is real and cannot be entirely disregarded. Postmodern-
ism cannot guarantee a politics that will be uniformly progressive or
whose practice will be consistently effective. But, to think otherwise is
to believe that the establishment of foundational truths is possible and
could ground a radical political praxis. The felt need that people have
91. Susan Bordo, Feminism, Postmodernism, and Gender-Scepticism, in LINDA J.
NICHOLSON, FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 131, 151 (1990) (footnote omitted).
92. Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, Feminist Theory, and Psychoanalytic Discourse, in
NICHOLSON, supra note 91, at 324, 327.
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for solid ground under their feet is an effect of traditional metaphysics'
mistaken insistence that, once fixed, truth will guide and insulate action
from error; the dream of reason can too easily become a deep sleep in
which the nightmare of lived oppression is forgotten. Politics is inside,
not outside, philosophy's suzerainty.
Postmodernism does not reject entirely the validity or use of 'wo-
man' or 'race.' To do so would add theoretical insult to existential in-
jury.93 Again, it problematizes and de-essentializes them so that their
metaphysical status can be challenged and their political character reaf-
firmed and revised. What is democratic or good politics is always con-
testable. There is no guarantee against tyranny-nothing can deliver us
from that. Postmodernists remind us (and themselves must not forget)
that, while there must be talk of a dawn of egalitarianism, there are
many who still live in the dusk of oppression. 94 No theoretical stand-
point alone can ensure that the long night's journey into light can be
accomplished without struggle, mistakes and further pain.
Deconstruction does not rule out or require any particular politics.
While it implies a progressive politics, it does not necessarily lead to
one. It is not surprising therefore that those who utilize the tools of
deconstructive critique have done so in both complacent and conten-
tious ways. For example, whereas Richard Rorty rests content with a
liberal rendering of postmodernism's political implications, Cornell
West puts postmodernism in the service of a more radical program of
transformative democracy.95 What is progressive can never be deter-
mined in advance or in the abstract; such assessment can only be made
with an attention to the local conditions and to the prevailing exigen-
cies of the situation. Postmodernism can open spaces for action and
increase opportunities for transformation, but it cannot fill these
spaces. Whether these openings become holes to fall down or climb
out of is left to those minded to act. All that a deconstructive mentality
can do is to show that power is never apart from reason: logic and
ambiguity, authority and arbitrariness, and universality and contin-
gency are implicated in each other. The risks and responsibility of re-
construction must remain with real people in real situations.
This may be unsatisfactory to many, but metaphysics only offers a
false sense of political security. Deflating pretensions about universal-
izing and totalizing efforts to capture justice and highlighting the sys-
temic and systematic source of oppression, postmodernism cannot
respond with its own theories of universalizing and totalizing rationali-
93. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
94. See Henry L. Gates, Jr., Statistical Stigmata, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1275, 1289
(1990).
95. RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, SOLIDARITY (1989); West, supra note
60.
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ties nor with its own systemic or systematic project of emancipation. 96
Nevertheless, a postmodern perspective does provide a compelling and
cogent critique of the growing resort to a politics of identity. Pinpoint-
ing a salient feature of social struggle and political experience, identity
politics infuses that contingent experience with an almost universal va-
lidity. Having defined and fixed that identity, it is pressed into ubiqui-
tous use "as a political point of departure, as a multivation for action,
and as a delineation of one's politics." '9 7 Within such a politics, the
central challenge is to resolve questions of personal identity and, by
doing so, a sense of personal liberation will be achieved through the
alleviation of oppression. To find out "who I am" is to engage in the
most personal and political of acts.
Initially, identity was found in the sororeal experience of Woman-
kind as a contrast to dominant notions of patriarchy. However, it be-
came obvious that a politics of sisterhood can lead to isolation,
exclusion and inequality. By flattening the diverse experience of wo-
men into one identity, the oppression to be overcome was subtly rein-
forced. The more recent challenge has been to recognize the
multiplicity of women's experience and oppression and to define more
sophisticated and less homogenous categories of identity. However,
the difficulty has been that, once the Pandora's box of gender is open, it
is difficult to salvage any identity that can be usefully defined or fixed as
'woman.' It is insufficient to add qualities, like black, working-class or
lesbian, to a primary identity for this will perpetuate the essentializing
orthodoxy to be disbanded. Nevertheless, the possibility of identity
politics and its radical value are still strongly defended. Many feminists
remain committed to the idea that "the most profound and potentially
the most radical politics come directly out of our own identity, as op-
posed to working to end somebody else's oppression." '98
The difficulty with identity politics is that it trades off a devalued
essentialism and lingers in the suspect shadows of a Platonic idealism.
The crucial problem is not that it incorporates a notion of identity per
se, but that the notion of identity relied upon is interpretively invalid
* and politically disutile. It tends to attribute an abiding unity to the con-
tingent social ramifications of certain biological characteristics and ex-
hausts itself in running the sleeveless errand of placing different
women somewhere along a hierarchical spectrum of oppression. In ef-
fect, identity politics de-politicizes politics by turning it into a meta-
physical issue and reaffirming its stultifying structure and effect. As
96. See WHITE, supra note 25, at 122.
97. Linda Alcoff, Cultural Feminism v. Post-Structuralist Feminism: The Identity Crisis
in Feminist Theory, in FEMINIST THEORY IN PRACTICE AND PROCESS 295 (Micheline R.
Malson et al. eds., 1989).
98. The Combahee River Collective, A Black Feminist Statement, in FEMINIST
FRAMEWORKS: ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN
WOMEN AND MEN 204 (Alison M. Jaggar & Paula S. Rothenberg eds., 1984).
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such, it repeats the essentialist error of creating a world based on the
timeless and global truths of black, female, gay lives. Identity politics
treats identity as the only site of political struggle: it is reductionist in
that identity is viewed as the beginning and end of social action. As
Edward Said puts it, the core of identity politics is "the supremely stub-
born thesis that everyone is principally and irreducibly a member of
some race or category, and that race or category cannot ever be assimi-
lated to or accepted by others-except as itself."99 Identity has an im-
portant role to play in understanding exploitation and oppression, but
it must be a different appreciation of identity.' 0 0
XI. THE POLITICS OF ACTION
"[A]nd I ask myself and you, which of our visions will claim us /Which
will we claim."
-Adrienne Rich' 0 '
Identity can be understood in richer and more postmodern ways
that accept that experiences are always partial and mediated and that
identity is always constructed and transformable. However, by taking
identity as something to be recovered and fixed, identity politics seems
to freeze in place the positionality of people and reduce the options for
personal and collective transformation. To understand the condition
of being oppressed as essentially tied to identity reinforces people's sta-
tus as oppressed and forever ties their identity to that of an oppressed
group. Consequently, for the postmodernist, the recognition of iden-
tity only constitutes a starting point, not an achievement, ambition or
program. The identification of someone as "oppressed" is only done
so as to turn that identity into something else and to be rid of oppres-
sion. The oppressed do not have intrinsic values simply by the fact of
their membership in an oppressed group. What they do have is a
strong political claim to be heard: "victims are entitled to insist on
others' attention not because they can offer virtue to a fallen world, but
because they are experts on their own lives."' 0 2
It is vital to listen, hear and act upon the views of those previously
victimized. But it is almost perverse and patronizing to treat those
views as possessing a Truth that no other voice of experience can claim.
Not beyond criticism, it has a special political valence in contemporary
circumstances of racism, sexism and homophobia. Oppression need
99. Edward Said, The Politics of Knowledge, II RARITAN 17, 21 (1991).
100. See BELL HOOKS, TALKING BACK: THINKING FEMINIST, THINKING BLACK (1989);
Brenda Cossman & Ratna Kapur, Trespass, Impasse, Collaboration: Doing Research on
Women's Rights in India, 2J. HUMAN. JUST. 99 (1991).
101. ADRIENNE RICH, Night and Days, in RICH, supra note 80, at 45.
102. Patricia J. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Diference Debate: A Post-Modern
Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296, 307
n. 112.
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not be idealized, but instead must be understood so as to eradicate it
more effectively. The views of outsiders are not essentially more valua-
ble, but they are more likely as a political matter to be of value to the
analysis of equality and any action to remedy it. So, for example, diver-
sifying the ownership of broadcast facilities so that people of color and
different cultural backgrounds are involved will increase the chances of,
not guarantee, a more diverse range of programming alternatives.' 03
Racial, gendered, class, and sexual identity neither guarantees truths
nor prevents truths from being established. Identity does matter be-
cause the present political terrain is itself contoured by the way certain
identities are thought of and treated.
The tendency to essentialize identity and authorize it as the warrant
of authenticity forces people to settle upon some united or primary
identity. This is debilitating to any prospect of a truly progressive poli-
tics. In a postmodern perspective, identity is always constructed, often
inconsistent and occasionally self-contradictory. As such, the felt need
to identify with one group obscures or blinds people to the multi-fac-
eted nature of injustice and people's multiple and fragmented selves.
At times, one aspect of individuals' identities may strongly influence
their opinions or response. At other times, a different aspect of individ-
uals' identities will play a stronger role. There is no way to predict with
certainty the values or stances that particular people will take in any or
every situation. Moreover, the tendency for people to see themselves
as only or primarily one identity-man, white or heterosexual-allows
them to evade responsibility for other kinds of oppression that co-exist.
In a recent article, Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr. defends the use of
personal autobiography in legal academy. As a black man of working-
class background, he insists that there is no neutral place to stand in
observing the law or any neutral way to engage in the legal process. In
some circumstances and locations, such as law school in the 1990s, he
argues that "who we are matters as much as what we are and what we
think."' 0 4 As a matter of contingent political wisdom, there can be lit-
tle doubt about the truth of the statement. However, as important as
race or color might be in contemporary North American society, Culp
has other identities as well. He is black, but he is not only black.
Whatever else he might be, he is also a man.
About halfway through his essay, Culp reveals the importance of
these other identities when he relates a short biographical incident:
103. See Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C.: Regrouping in
Singular Times, 104 HARV. L. REV. 525 (1990).
104. Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding
the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539, 543 (1991). I take this to be a non-
essentialist claim because Culp later writes that "my point in this essay is not that
all black people have suffered more than all white people, or even that all black law
professors have suffered more than all white law professors." Id. at 558.
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I teach tort law, and early in that process I use a hypothetical from
my past. As an undergraduate at the University of Chicago, I asked my
girlfriend to accompany me to Evanston, Illinois. We got off the train
from downtown Chicago with our very long and newly-hip Afros and
began walking around Evanston. Near the train station we saw an old
white woman. As my girlfriend and I approached the woman, she be-
gan to shake. The closer we came to her the more she shook. As I
write about this incident, I can remember the beauty of that former
girlfriend's face but not her name. But I remember as clearly as I can
taste my last cup of coffee the old white woman turning her back and
assuming a pseudo-fetal posture as we approached her. I could read
that situation as clearly as any other: for the old white woman, the
black revolution had come to Evanston. She saw us not as the well-
dressed black college students that we were, but as mythic black revolu-
tionaries. In her mind, she knew we were Black Panthers who had
come to Evanston to do her harm.' 0 5
Asking the class if it would have been an assault to lean over and
whisper "boo" to that old woman, he proceeds to use this incident to
great political effect in challenging white students to confront racial
stereotyping and in invigorating black students in their political sense
of belonging. It is an intellectually stimulating and politically effective
demonstration of "how much tort law is socially-constructed cus-
tom."106 However, for all the good work this does on breaking down
racial stereotyping, it manages to leave undisturbed and give passive
approval to traditional stereotyping of women.
In his account, he refers to his girlfriend who was with him. Mindful
that he knew her well enough to be designated "his girlfriend," he re-
calls that "I can remember the beauty of that former girlfriend's face
but not her name." In this dramatic anecdote, the woman remains un-
named and construed only as an object of beauty; the person is eclipsed
by the bodily appearance. By the simple device of referring to her as
simply a friend without mentioning her gender or status, Culp could
have avoided the silent sleight that his insensitivity gives. I offer this
observation more as a caution than a rebuke. But, in the struggle to
combat one form of oppression, it is important that other kinds of op-
pression are not ignored or condoned, no matter how slight or unin-
tended the omission. Ending some people's oppression is inseparable
from the struggle to end all people's oppression.
Identity does matter and, as Culp convincingly demonstrates, iden-
tity alone may sometimes in some contexts speak louder than any
words of explanation or indignation. But the ineffable impact of iden-
tity cannot always be relied upon to get the job done: it can only be
one tactic in a more complex strategy of politicization. The force of
identity is important, but only when it is understood as a contingent
105. Id. at 552.
106. Id. at 553.
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and dynamic distillation of what has been done, what is being done and
what will be done. While identities affect people's choices and actions,
the choices made and actions taken affect people's identities. As "the
linchpin of social discipline,"' 10 7 identities are a site to be constantly
struggled over and frequently transformed; it is not a psychic space of
the authentic self to be repaired to or moved toward.
As the postmodern challenge is to Identity as an essential ontology
rather than to identities as socio-historical constructs, the deconstruc-
tion of identity does not proscribe the possibility of a reconstructed
politics. A politics of identities will be attainable and attractive. As
long as it is not thought of as a backward-looking project to preserve or
retrieve a lost identity, but is acted upon as an engaged means of work-
ing to overcome all sectarianism. After all, identity is forged through
action. Action is not an independent behavior from or an instinctive
reflex of a fixed and settled identity: the postmodern temper accepts
that "there need not be 'a doer behind the deed,' but that the doer 'is
variably constructed in and through the deed."'1 8 What people do is
what people are and what people are is what they do.
In understanding action and identity as inseparable and mutually re-
constituting, it becomes possible to grasp race, gender, sexual orienta-
tion and class as thoroughly historical and, therefore, inescapably polit-
ical in character. There is nothing essential or "natural" about
people's identities. While experienced as real, they are always con-
structed and, therefore, always reconstructible. None of this denies the
stubborn and almost recalcitrant patterns of oppressive conduct-eco-
nomic exploitation, sexual violence, racial hatred-that continue to ex-
act their daily toll. However, contrary to their critics' jeremiads,
postmodernists refuse to be despondent or despairing. By hammering
home the reconstructive incitements of the deconstructive insight, they
can, at least, contribute to the struggle for social justice and individual
empowerment.
Perhaps more importantly, postmoderism can give the lie to the
fact that discrimination is about personal prejudice. It is and can be
about that, but it is about much more as well. Discrimination is a public
phenomenon as much as a personal state of mind. It speaks to the so-
cial conditions that comprise societies that are long on egalitarian talk
and short on effective action. By concentrating more on individuals'
intentions than on the consequences of their actions, the reality of dis-
crimination is obscured.' 0 9 More importantly, steps to eradicate the
107. McGOWAN, supra note 44, at 223.
108. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF
IDENTITY 142 (1990); see also Jenny Bourne, Homelands of the Mind: Jewish Feminism
and Identity Politics, 24 RACE & CLASS 1 (1987).
109. See generally Alan D. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in THE
POLITICS OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 96 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
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problems and improve the lives of those discriminated against are
stymied. For example, racism is more than the conscious conspiracy of
a power elite or the crazed delusions of bigots; it is part of the historical
culture, social heritage and political tradition." 0 Moreover, by re-cast-
ing identities in terms of becoming as much as being, a postmodern
inquiry can locate the sources of discrimination in the systemic and
structural patterns of behavior in which people engage and which go to
shape people's identities. As race and gender are constituted in and
through social history, racism and sexism are social practices.
Bigotry-intentional racism, sexism, homophobia-is only the most
virulent symptom of a much broader and more insidious disease. Pri-
vate attitudes of contempt and exclusion are to be condemned, but they
far from exhaust the catalogue of discriminatory behavior. By focus-
sing on the dubious moral values of limited pathological or jaundiced
individuals, the political dimension and character of discrimination is
overlooked. Discrimination is not simply about the mores of particular
people, but implicates the whole social and institutional setting within
which structural conditions of inequality continue. Discrimination re-
mains so pervasive and entrenched because it is not solely personal.
Being systemic, it permeates both power structures and personal
relations.
To view discrimination in any other way is to allow the majority of
non-bigoted people to validate their righteous indignation at being
termed "racist." The racist, sexist or homophobe is not an aberrational
figure in civic culture. It is the collective culture as much as its individ-
ual citizens that is to be chastised. More importantly, a politics of iden-
tity rather than action allows people to deny responsibility for the
diminished lives of people who still enjoy the social consequences of
sexism, racism and homophobia. By persisting in thinking discrimina-
tion is more about personal identity and private attitudes than public
actions and social conditions, the chances of confounding discrimina-
tion and establishing a truly egalitarian society are reduced.
XII. CONCLUSION
But where is the Author (and/or the Reader)? Who is the Author
(and/or the Reader)? Who will speak for the Author (and/or the
Reader)? Will he/she/it show him/her/itself so that I might speak to
him/her/it, so that I might speak with him/her/it, so that I might speak
against him/her/it, so that I might speak about his/her/its text? And
who might that Author (and/or Reader) speak to, with, against or
about? Who or what is his/her/its "I"? As Mary Joe might have said:
"What a drag!"
110. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
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OBITUARY
Universally acclaimed scholar and raconteur, T.H.E. Author, was
pronounced dead after many years of doubt surrounding his wherea-
bouts. Details about his death are as sketchy as reliable information
about his life. Most agree though that, throughout his life, he enjoyed
a popularity and influence that few others can boast or come close to
emulating.
In what was to set a pattern for the rest of his life, the circumstances
of his birth and early years are difficult to ascertain or verify: they are
the stuff of scholarly speculation and academic dispute. It is widely be-
lieved though that, as a beloved member of the Enlightenment, he was
adopted into the immediate family of God. He became the founding
president of the great Literary Tradition.
Unparalleled in erudition and education, there were few areas of
learning on which he was not an authority. Honored by universities
throughout the world, he set a standard of wisdom and learning the
like of which had not been seen before and is not likely to be seen
again. He devoted his working life to the public realm and managed to
fulfill an enormous calendar of appearances and events. It is widely
conceded that he left an indelible mark on the epistemic legacy of the
last few centuries. He led an enviably productive life and was named
"Man of the Year" on innumerable occasions.
He travelled extensively and became fluent in a bewildering range
of languages and dialects. Always speaking in resonant and authorita-
tive tones, he commanded attention and respect wherever he went. He
knew most of the leading figures of his day and was courted by the
most powerful figures in various societies around the world. He was an
intimate confidante of Babe T. Ruth and Noah Ledge.
However, little is known about his private life. While he was in-
volved in publishing literally millions of books and pamphlets, he left
no personal memoirs, journals or diaries. Those who did manage to
meet him report that he could be rather distant and aloof, finding it
difficult to engage in light conversation or small talk. His manner was
such as to brook little dissent and he received a deep, if often begrudg-
ing deference from those he encountered. Above all else, he knew his
own mind and did not hesitate to speak it.
In his lifetime, he was patron of many organizations and gave his
considerable support to all manner of enterprises. His agreement to
become involved in any textual cause seemed to ensure its success and
well-being. Nevertheless, there were several notorious incidents in
which his name and authority were invoked without his permission. It
was a testimony to his influence and prestige that, once these bogus
endorsements were revealed, the promoted texts lost all value in the
marketplace of ideas and often sank without future trace.
By the end of his life, his influence was beginning to wane: centu-
ries of pre-eminence and prominence had taken its toll. Announce-
ments of his presence at any particular gathering no longer generated
the same excitement and anticipation. Indeed, as is their wont, some
Young Turks began to challenge his right to be heard at all and to
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question his credentials for having such an aristocratic bearing. Sud-
denly beginning to show age and to lose his argumentative edge, he
became conspicuous by his absence from the literary and philosophical
scene.
The exact circumstances of his demise are as shadowy as those of
his birth. Some say he simply died of old age at his desk, while putting
pen to paper; he had lost the will to continue the life-long struggle
against the forces of anarchy and disorder. As no body has ever been
found, some refuse to accept that he is really dead. There are reported
sightings of him on a regular basis. Some enthusiasts claim that they
still detect a trace of his presence in the most prosaic and profound
settings. For such Auctorians, his body may have withered, but his
spirit lives on.
Others suggest that he died in more mysterious and less noble cir-
cumstances. Suspecting foul play, they maintain that he did not volun-
tarily step out of the scholarly spotlight, but was shoved. Conspiracy
theories abound, and there have been several high-powered commis-
sions established to review all the available evidence; but no genuine
consensus exists or is likely to prevail. The main suspect is one Rolly
Barthes. Late of an elite French resistance movement, he was also
known as The Reader. But most informed observers maintain that it
could not have been the work of one person. Consequently, the jury of
historical opinion remains out and a whole generation of textual critics
are suspect.
Although never married, he is believed to have been a prolific pro-
genitor. Many men and women of all creeds and colors claim to be his
legitimate heirs. For good or bad reason, each wants to lay claim to the
vast stock of cultural capital that he accumulated in his lifetime and that
he is alleged to have stashed away for future retrieval. Although he
probably hoped to rest in peace, he is more likely to be wrested into
pieces. In a manner of speaking, he was the author of his own fate." 1
1 11. I am grateful to Wendy Griesdorf whose initial inspiration was responsible
for the idea of an obituary.
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